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Antitrust Class Actions in the Wake of Procedural Reform
CHRISTINE P. BARTHOLOMEW*
What is the current vitality of antitrust enforcement? Antitrust class actions—the
primary mode of competition oversight—has weathered two decades of procedural
reform. This Article documents the effects of those reforms. Relying on an original
dataset of over 1300 antitrust class action settlements, this Article finds such cases
alive but far from well. Certain suits do succeed on an impressive scale, returning
billions of dollars to victims. But class action reform has made antitrust enforcement
narrower, more time-consuming, and costlier than only a decade ago. And, as this
Article’s sources reveal, new battle lines are forming. Across the political spectrum,
people are trumpeting antitrust as the next great hope to resolve trade issues,
equalize wealth inequity, and reform Big Tech. Even amid these rising calls, class
action opponents continue to campaign for more reform. This Article describes those
efforts and provides the essential data to repel them.
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INTRODUCTION
Critics have long maligned private antitrust enforcement as ineffective, impotent,
and even dangerous to competitive markets. Since 2005, these doom merchants have
succeeded in pushing through a cascade of legislative and judicial reforms hostile to
antitrust class actions.1 Once a new reform goes into effect, more are swiftly
demanded. Antitrust class actions have become harder to plead, certify, and litigate
than at the start of the century. But now, a growing populist voice is calling for
stronger oversight in Silicon Valley and beyond.2 Perhaps not so ironically, antitrust

1. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Stefan Paulovic, Class Certification: Developments
over the Last Five Years, 2002–2007, in CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 2008: PROSECUTION AND
DEFENSE STRATEGIES 195, 195–96 (Joel S. Feldman & Keith M. Fleischman, eds., 2007)
(“[T]he tide has turned against class certification, and new barriers have arisen across a variety
of contexts where formerly class certification had seemed automatic.”); Myriam Gilles, Class
Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59
DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 307 (2010) (discussing “a broader shift in judicial philosophy” against
class actions).
2. See, e.g., Richard B. Baker, Carola Frydman & Eric Hilt, Politics and Antitrust:
Lessons from the Gilded Age, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 2, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/02/politics-and-antitrust-lessons-from-the-gildedage/ [https://perma.cc/3QZ3-PRLN] (“Recent years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in
antitrust.”); Joshua Wright & Aurelien Portuese, Antitrust Populism: Towards a Taxonomy,
25 STAN. J.L., BUS. & FIN. 131, 134 (2020) (“The global antitrust community has witnessed a
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enforcement is declining while market concentration is on the rise.3 This bipartisan
groundswell will need the procedural means to make markets more competitive.
Antitrust class actions could respond to this call—but only if a decade of sustained
reform has not left them too anemic.
As the head of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) explains, the “[s]tudy of
enforcement successes and failures” is needed to guide “the healthy development of
the antitrust laws.”4 To date, legal scholarship offers conflicting diagnoses of
antitrust class actions. While some characterize such litigation as dangerously
powerful and demand its immediate curtailment,5 others fear it is already too weak
to fulfill its vital enforcement function.6 Both views rely mostly on conjecture.
Existing scholarship, though laudable, offers precious little evidence on the effects
of a generation of legislative and judicial tinkering.7 Antitrust-specific studies are
scant. What exists involves limited sample sizes and descriptive analytics without
predictive or prescriptive dimensions.8 This Article remedies that shortage.
Gauging antitrust enforcement in the United States means focusing on class
actions. Theoretically, private consumer class actions share enforcement oversight
with competitors or federal, state, and local governments.9 Realistically, private
enforcement is the primary regulator: antitrust class actions exceed government

reanimation of populist sentiments that once dominated the field.”).
3. See infra Part II.B. and accompanying footnotes.
4. Joshua D. Wright, Elyse Dorsey, Jonathan Klick & Jan M. Rybnicek, Requiem for a
Paradox: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293,
295 n.6 (2019).
5. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) (contending class actions allow “the entrepreneurial attorney
[to] serve her own interest at the expense of the client”); Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and
the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals,
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 79–80 (2003).
6. See, e.g., Donald R. Frederico, The Arc of Class Actions: A View from the Trenches,
32 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 266, 280 (2020) (“[M]any have fretted that class actions are on
life support.”); Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions Part II: A Respite from the Decline, 92
N.Y.U. L. REV. 971, 972 (2017) (“I did not declare the class action device dead, but I did
express concern that it had been severely weakened.”).
7. Prior related empirical research is more limited in scope. Two studies focused on class
actions generally. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses
in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248 (2010); Theodore
Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller & Roy Germano, Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions: 2009–2013,
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 937 (2017) (updating their 1993–2008 study and analyzing solely published
opinions); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee
Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811 (2010) (analyzing all class action opinions but for
the limited period of 2006–2007).
8. See, e.g., JOSHUA DAVIS & ROSE KOHLES, 2019 ANTITRUST REPORT: CLASS ACTION
FILINGS
IN
FEDERAL
COURT
(2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3696575 [https://perma.cc/MW2K-Q9J8]; Robert H. Lande & Joshua
P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F.
L. REV. 879, 883–89 (2008).
9. See, e.g., James J. O’Connell, Editor’s Note: Antitrust and the Limits of Globalization,
29 ANTITRUST 4, 6 (2015).
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actions by more than twenty-five-to-one.10 Thus, the foundation of this Article is a
dataset of published and unpublished federal antitrust final settlement approval
decisions from 2005–2020, the fifteen-year period following enactment of the Class
Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The most exhaustive gathering of such decisions to
date, this dataset spans 393 final approval opinions—over 1300 settlements
involving the rights of hundreds of millions of consumers. To bolster this material,
this Article adds carefully culled docket analytics, motion practice statistics, and
material from attorney fee and cost award requests. Combined, this data fully refutes
some critiques levied against antitrust class actions and drastically qualifies others.
Richly laden with information about what legal claims successfully clear which
types of procedural hurdles, judicial settlement approval decisions reveal the
heretofore unknown scope and limits of modern antitrust enforcement. They confirm
what some long feared: all is not well with antitrust class actions. Quantitatively,
class action reforms have hobbled private antitrust enforcement—at a cost to its
consumer protection goals. By design, antitrust laws combat a wide range of market
misconduct and monopoly power distortion.11 But procedural reforms have limited
private enforcement’s reach. Nearly ninety percent of the settlements involved
wrongdoing by cartels.12 Cases challenging other anticompetitive conduct, including
abuse of monopoly power, are vanishing.13 And even the future of enforcement
against cartels is uncertain. The 1328 settlements examined for this Article show how
risky an enterprise private antitrust enforcement has become. This litigation is
increasingly more costly for plaintiffs’ attorneys in terms of both time and expense.
Gone are the days when certification of a class signaled a likely settlement. Today,
class certification is but the first of many hurdles. Multiple rounds of procedural

10. See AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST
INSTITUTE’S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES 222 (2008), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/work-product/aai-transitionreport-on-competition-policy-to-the-44th-president-of-the-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/9EBN-3VJY]. Rivals frequently have business reasons to avoid suing a
competitor. See Christine P. Bartholomew, Death by Daubert: The Continued Attack on
Private Antitrust, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2147, 2198 (2014) (explaining how competitors may
want to enter joint ventures or merge); see also Clare Deffense, Comment, A Farewell to Arms:
The Implementation of a Policy-Based Standing Analysis in Antitrust Treble Damages Actions,
72 CALIF. L. REV. 437, 464 (1984). Government oversight by the Department of Justice (DOJ),
the FTC, and state actors depends on political whim and financial backing—which waver by
administration. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 207, 230 (2003); see, e.g., Oversight of the Department of Justice: Political
Interference and Threats to Prosecutorial Independence Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 116th Cong. 2–3 (2020) (statement of John W. Elias, Attorney, Department of
Justice) (describing 2019 DOJ antitrust investigations triggered by “[p]ersonal dislike of the
industry” and presidential tweets rather than “on an antitrust analysis”).
11. See, e.g., John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and
Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2469 (2013)
(“Congress and the American people want an antitrust system that protects consumers and
small suppliers from exploitative behavior—behavior that takes their wealth without providing
them with offsetting benefits.”).
12. See infra Part II.B.2.
13. See Bartholomew, supra note 10.
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gatekeeping are the new norm. The average settled case first cleared 10.62
dispositive motions and lasted almost five years.14
For all that antitrust class action has suffered over the last two decades, the data
underlying this Article hints at another approaching wave of reforms. Tort reformers,
thinly guised as consumer advocates, have co-opted the settlement approval process,
using it to push the judiciary to procedurally limit private enforcement in new ways.
They urge courts to redefine what counts as a permissible settlement and reduce the
financial incentives for undertaking private enforcement.15 The settlement data,
coupled with docket analytics, belie the ruinous ramifications of such changes.
This Article unfolds as follows. Part I summarizes three key procedural reforms
to class actions and explains why the settlement approval process provides a telling
lens to assess those reforms’ impact. Part II sets out the findings of this Article’s
original dataset. It details the deleterious effects of statutory and doctrinal procedural
reform on the overall health of antitrust class actions, and it identifies where antitrust
cases have survived such challenges. Part III, the prophetic portion of the Article,
uses information gleaned from settlement objectors to anticipate—and refute—the
next round of potential attacks on private enforcement.
I. ANTITRUST REFORMS AND SETTLEMENTS
Antitrust class actions fulfill a critical role in the stability of the economy.16 Such
cases blend the gains of antitrust and class actions, from regulatory oversight to
deterrence to judicial access.17 Consumers function as “champions of semi-public
rights”18—a collective David against corporate Goliaths. Harms, too small to bring
individually, are aggregated.19 The costs of litigation can easily exceed individual
recoupment in these cases, which lead to class action suits as we know now.20 As a

14. See infra Part II.B (discussing procedural hurdles and case length).
15. See infra Part III (discussing objector proposed reforms).
16. See, e.g., In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., No.
05-MD-1720, 2019 WL 6888488, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2019) (recognizing “a genuine
public interest in bringing private antitrust class actions”).
17. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (discussing how Congress
created private enforcement to “deter violators and deprive them of the fruits of their illegal
actions, and to provide ample compensation to the victims of antitrust violations”); accord
Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675, 678 n.7
(2010) (“[P]rivate suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available to
the Department of Justice . . . .” (quoting Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp.,
456 U.S. 556, 572 n.10 (1982))).
18. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 717 (1941).
19. In re Modafinil Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 238, 259 (3d Cir. 2016) (describing “the
typical class action” as aggregating “hundreds or thousands of claims . . . to ensure that the
wrongdoer is held accountable and that small claims are vindicated” (citing Thorogood v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2008))); cf. Christine P. Bartholomew,
Redefining Prey and Predator in Class Actions, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 743, 784 (2015)
[hereinafter Redefining Prey] (“Consumers have the right to sue for corporate wrongdoing;
however, that right is illusory given the expense of individual litigation.” (footnote omitted)).
20. See Redefining Prey, supra note 19, at 755 n.89.
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class, consumers challenge restraints of trade21 and push back against consolidation
of market power that risks “the spirit, verve, and élan of the nation.”22
Beyond a generalized notion that some enforcement is necessary, little else about
antitrust engenders consensus. Private enforcement sits at the intersection of two
contentious debates: (1) substantive disagreements regarding what anticompetitive
conduct to regulate, and (2) procedural disagreements about how much regulatory
power class actions should have. The substantive battles over “the soul of antitrust”
date back decades.23 This Article responds to the procedural skirmishes.
Procedure controls the true reach of law. Or, as Representative John Dingell more
colorfully stated, “I’ll let you write the substance . . . you let me write the procedure,
and I’ll screw you every time.”24 Thus, the only way to evaluate the efficacy of
modern antitrust efforts is to first fully understand the consequences of procedural
changes. Part I spells out how class action critiques influenced a flurry of procedural
reforms. It focuses on three exemplars of how, though trans-substantive, these
changes complicate antitrust enforcement. It then explains that settlements expose
the impact of these reforms and uncover future efforts lying in wait.
A. The “Reformed” Antitrust Class Action
Class actions have faced a wave of procedural reforms spearheaded in part by tort
reformers.25 Reform efforts trace their roots to the 1980s, when conservatives began
targeting civil rights class actions.26 By the 1990s, the target expanded to class
actions more generally.27 Critics feared class actions would spark a “litigation
explosion” and undermine efforts to roll back regulatory oversight.28
These critics maintain class actions are little more than legalized blackmail that
trigger inadequate “sweetheart” deals.29 Plaintiffs’ attorneys insist on filing suits on

21. Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2543, 2546 (2013).
22. Carl T. Bogus, The New Road to Serfdom: The Curse of Bigness and the Failure of
Antitrust, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 2 (2015).
23. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 917,
917 (1987). Previous scholarship fully details the changing substantive reach of antitrust. See
generally TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018);
Jeffrey L. Harrison, After Forty Years of Antitrust Revision and Apple Inc. v. Pepper, What
Now Illinois Brick?, 11 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 695 (2020); William Kolasky, Antitrust
Litigation: What’s Changed in Twenty-Five Years?, 27 ANTITRUST 9, 11 (2012).
24. Regulatory Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. L. &
Governmental Rels. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement
of Rep. John Dingell).
25. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 1.
26. See, e.g., David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part II: Litigation
and Legitimacy, 1981–1994, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1810 (2018).
27. See id. at 1804.
28. Id. at 1808–09 (reflecting a change of course from the expansion of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 in response to the Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases).
29. See, e.g., Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements
in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1381 (2000) (defining
sweetheart settlements). For variants of the sweetheart deal narrative, see John C. Coffee, Jr.,
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behalf of uninterested consumers.30 Once certified as a class action, defendants may
have no rational choice but to settle even meritless cases.31 Class counsel then resolve
claims on the cheap in exchange for inflated attorney fee awards.32
While tales of sweetheart deals and blackmail settlements exist across class
actions, antitrust suits generate particular suspicion. Reformers claim antitrust class
actions “piggy-back” on existing government investigations, increasing the risk to
defendants without any additional deterrent gains.33 Class litigation is too blunt an
instrument that threatens “[m]istaken inferences”34 and chills legitimate
procompetitive conduct.35 This speculation festers despite a bipartisan 2007 report
by the Antitrust Modernization Commission finding “[n]o actual cases or evidence
of systematic overdeterrence.”36
Animus toward class actions has spurred significant reform, starting with the
enactment of CAFA. In March 2005, Congress expanded federal diversity
jurisdiction, moving most state class actions into federal court.37 Class action critics

Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995);
Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051 (1996).
30. See, e.g., Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging
Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1239, 1243 (discussing how
“[c]orporate defendants, reform-minded legislators, and the business press” characterize class
action counsel as “‘greedy,’ ‘extortionist’ ‘bounty hunters’”); Martin H. Redish & Nathan D.
Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process,
95 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (2007) (discussing how class actions hamper “the right to control
one’s own litigation”).
31. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 784–85 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Class actions create the opportunity for a kind of legalized
blackmail: a greedy and unscrupulous plaintiff might use the threat of a large class action,
which can be costly to the defendant, to extract a settlement far in excess of the individual
claims’ actual worth.” (emphasis in original)). But see Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Exploding
the Blackmail Myth: A New Perspective on Class Action Settlements, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 681
(2005) (debunking the blackmail myth).
32. See, e.g., Neil M. Goldstein, Preserving Fee-Shifting After Evans v. Jeff D.: Joint
Attorney/Client Control of Settlements, 11 INDUS. RELS. L.J. 267, 269 (1989).
33. David Rosenberg & James P. Sullivan, Coordinating Private Class Action and Public
Agency Enforcement of Antitrust Law, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 159, 161 (2006) (“[M]any
antitrust class actions merely ‘piggy-back’ on public enforcement . . . .” (citation omitted));
see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940 (2001)
(“The effect is to lengthen the original lawsuit, complicate settlement, magnify and protract
the uncertainty engendered by the litigation, and increase litigation costs.”).
34. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. L. Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414
(2004) (“Mistaken inferences and the resulting false condemnations ‘are especially costly,
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’” (citation
omitted)).
35. See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Error Costs & IP Law, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 175, 201
(2014) (maintaining “[t]he costs of false positives, given their likelihood, swamp any gains
from adding a layer of antitrust enforcement”).
36. DEBORAH A. GARZA ET AL., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N: REP. AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
247
(2007),
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/
report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y3B-CLNT].
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2005).
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insisted state courts were too plaintiff friendly, so federal jurisdiction was necessary
to equalize the treatment of defendants.38
Once solidly in federal court, private antitrust enforcement faced an increasingly
pro-corporate, anti-class action Supreme Court majority.39 Through a series of
judicial opinions, the Court increased the procedural hurdles for antitrust class
actions. Lower courts soon followed suit. The next subsections consider just three of
the many changes40 to procedure: increased pleading standards, forced arbitration,
and stricter class certification requirements.
1. Twiqbal
First, just two years after CAFA’s enactment, the Supreme Court began requiring
more aggressive judicial screening of complaints.41 Previously, for over fifty years,
a complaint needed only provide a “short and plain statement” of the relief sought.42
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly revised this standard, holding a complaint must state
facts “plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)” illegal conduct.43 The Court

38. See Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109–2, § 2(a)(4)(B), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005)
(discussing potential state court biases against defendants). The accuracy of this concern is
debatable. See PUB. CITIZEN’S CONG. WATCH, CLASS ACTION “JUDICIAL HELLHOLES”:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IS LACKING 3 (2005), http://www.citizen.org/documents/
OutlierReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/PW82-26KB] (explaining very few jurisdictions are
“unfair” to defendants). However, the pro-defendant benefit of a federal forum is well-settled.
See Willy E. Rice, Allegedly “Biased,” “Intimidating,” and “Incompetent” State Court
Judges and the Questionable Removal of State Law Class Actions to Purportedly “Impartial”
and “Competent” Federal Courts—A Historical Perspective and an Empirical Analysis of
Class Action Dispositions in Federal and State Courts, 1925–2011, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L.
REV. 419, 541 (2012) (“Corporate defendants’ ‘win’ ratios in federal courts are 66.7% and
84.6%, respectively.” (footnote omitted)). Thus, while CAFA was enacted to promote fairness,
in actuality, it has helped corporations evade class action liability.
39. See, e.g., Redefining Prey, supra note 19, at 766.
40. See generally Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (holding that indirect
purchasers do not have sufficient injury to bring an antitrust claim). This is not to say that
procedure is the only aspect of antitrust litigation that has changed. The scope of substantive
issues has also narrowed over time. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. L. Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko,
LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); see also Bartholomew, supra note 10, at 2164.
41. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (“The decisive
answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out
in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is ‘a
short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” (footnote omitted)); see also Christine
P. Bartholomew, Twiqbal in Context, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 744, 747–51 (2016) (discussing the
pre-Twombly pleading standard).
43. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. The decision shows a clear disdain for private
enforcement, characterizing class actions as “tak[ing] up the time of a number of other people,
with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.” Id. at
558 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
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added onto the new standard two years later in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.44 Courts must now
screen complaints using a two-step process: (1) distinguish facts from legal
conclusions; and (2) based on those facts, use “judicial experience and common
sense” to evaluate whether there is a plausible claim for relief.45 Combined,
“Twiqbal” allows courts to dismiss implausible claims, as well as claims that—
though potentially plausible—are thin on facts at filing, well before a plaintiff can
undertake discovery.46
The new pleading standard means little for many areas of law.47 But for antitrust,
it injects subjectivity into motions to dismiss.48 Judges can disagree over whether a
complaint alleges sufficient circumstantial facts to shift from a possible to a plausible
conspiracy. This subjectivity is particularly fatal for section 1 cartel claims.49 Few
defendants are forthcoming about illegal agreements, and evidence of such deals is
difficult, if not impossible, to fully gather pre-discovery.50
Twiqbal similarly poses a risk to section 2 claims or vertical agreements under
section 1. Claims must be plausible in order to survive a motion to dismiss, which
requires a complaint allege facts showing that the harm the plaintiff suffered was
traceable to impermissible conduct. Only injuries “of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent” are actionable.51 This procedural requirement compounds what
is already a heightened standard. Consequently, Twiqbal allows a judge to sort
permissible from impermissible competitive conduct, affording judges “discretion to
dismiss claims based on hunches and policy animosity.”52 Even if a judge finds the
alleged conduct problematic, the complaint must still plausibly allege a causal link
between the wrongdoing and the suffered harm. This showing can be insuperable. If
the judge suspects any other market force caused the plaintiffs’ harm, he may dismiss
the claim. As Judge Martin of the Sixth Circuit explains, “it is difficult to see how
any antitrust plaintiff—short of those few omniscient plaintiffs that happen to know

44. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
45. Id. at 678–69.
46. Cf. Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Economic Sense and Sensibility: Matsushita and the
Rise of the Battle of the Experts, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 47 (2018); Suzette M. Malveaux, Clearing
Civil Procedural Hurdles in the Quest for Justice, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 621, 626 (2011)
(discussing the problems Twiqbal poses to claims dependent on discovery).
47. Bartholomew, supra note 10, at 2187.
48. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 33 (2010) (“Although judicial discretion—
and its potential for inconsistency—is hardly a novel aspect of Rule 12(b)(6) motion practice,
the invocation in Twombly and Iqbal of highly subjective factors may have made it the
determinative factor in deciding whether a plaintiff will be allowed to proceed to discovery.”).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (prohibiting unlawful contracts, combinations, or conspiracies).
50. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Pleading Problem in Antitrust Cases and Beyond,
95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 55, 58 (2010) (discussing the problematic nature of Twombly for
plaintiffs attempting to plead implicit market division agreements); Malveaux, supra note 46,
at 624 (“[O]ne judge may dismiss a complaint while another concludes that it survives, solely
because of the way each judge applies his or her ‘judicial experience and common sense.’ This
is bound to create unpredictability, lack of uniformity, and confusion.”).
51. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
52. Roger M. Michalski, Assessing Iqbal, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.,
https://harvardlpr.com/online-articles/assessing-iqbal/ [https://perma.cc/4PNQ-SUG3].

367408-ILJ 97-4_Text.indd 241

6/15/22 12:59 PM

1324

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:1315

every relevant factual detail before the inception of litigation and without the benefit
of discovery—will be able to overcome a motion to dismiss.”53 Despite multiple,
unsuccessful attempts to overturn or narrow Twiqbal, the plausibility standard still
controls.54
2. Mandatory Individual Arbitration
An antitrust case only faces Twiqbal challenges if the case can be heard by a court.
Other procedural changes limit which suits even reach this initial stage. In 2010, in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court upheld arbitration class action
waivers.55 In doing so, it invalidated a pro-consumer California law barring such
contractual provisions. The Court then doubled down on its pro-arbitration, anti-class
action position in 2013. In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, a
divided Court approved an arbitration class action waiver in a Sherman Act section
1 case.56 To the Court’s five-to-three majority, contractual freedom trumps judicial
access, not to mention the legislative intent of the Sherman Act in general.57 An
arbitration clause that waives consumers’ ability to bring a class action is binding,
even if the clause effectively “foreclose[s] [them] from vindicating [their] right to
redress antitrust harm.”58
By coupling arbitration provisions and class action prohibitions, a company can
shield itself from the primary form of antitrust oversight.59 As Justice Kagan noted
in her dissent to Italian Colors, “[t]he monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to
insist on a contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse.”60
Unsurprisingly, companies are taking up this shield. As of 2019, seventy-eight of the
top hundred largest companies prohibit class actions and require arbitration.61 Few,
if any, reasonable consumers would pursue litigation to enforce their antitrust rights
in the face of such provisions. Going at it alone means a consumer foregoes the
benefits of scale and negotiating power of a class when facing the resources of a

53. NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 461 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original)
(citing Freightliner of Knoxville, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Vans, LLC, 474 F.3d 865, 874 (6th
Cir. 2007)).
54. See, e.g., Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009); Open
Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009).
55. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
56. 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
57. Id. at 241 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Congress created the Sherman Act's private cause
of action not solely to compensate individuals, but to promote ‘the public interest in vigilant
enforcement of the antitrust laws.’” (citation omitted)).
58. Id. at 240 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
59. See Thomas F. Bush, Arbitration in Antitrust Cases, FREEBORN & PETERS LLP,
https://www.freeborn.com/sites/default/files/arbitration_in_antitrust_cases_-_freeborn.pdf
[https://perma.cc/34DB-53XF] (“[W]hen an arbitration clause prohibits class arbitration, the
defendant has effectively protected itself from a class action, whether in arbitration or in court.
If individual claims are not economically feasible, the defendant may have effectively
immunized itself from liability for treble damages for an antitrust violation.”).
60. Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 240 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
61. Imre Stephen Szalai, The Prevalence of Consumer Arbitration Agreements by
America’s Top Companies, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 233, 234 (2019).
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corporation. Even then, arbitration makes little sense. A plaintiff in arbitration is less
likely to prevail,62 must work with less discovery, and has no effective right to
appeal.63 The initial cost alone to file an arbitration claim can exceed a plaintiff’s
potential recovery.64 Realistically, this procedural reform limits private antitrust
enforcement to those few industries that have yet to adopt these contractual
protections.
3. Class Certification
Class actions have had a target on their back for a while, and the courts have been
more than willing to take aim.65 Due to various legislative and court-made reforms,
it is now more difficult than ever to state a class claim.66 Class action suits are
incredibly unlikely to reach merit-based decisions.67
Private antitrust cases that navigate the dangerous waters of arbitration provisions
and Twiqbal are still far from calm waters. Judges are also erecting higher standards
for class certification.68 A case does not begin as a class action. Putative class actions
must satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)’s requirements of numerosity,
typicality, commonality, and adequacy, as well as at least one of the subsections
under Rule 23(b).69 Most often, antitrust cases are brought under Rule 23(b)(3),
which sets out two additional requirements: superiority70 and predominance.71 One
factor for superiority is manageability, meaning whether foreseeable difficulties
make an alternative method of litigation preferable.72

62. Andrea Cann Chandrasekher & David Horton, Arbitration Nation: Data from Four
Providers, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 55 (2019) (“[T]he plaintiff win rate in arbitration is generally
lower than its analogue in the judicial system.”).
63. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Privatizing Civil Justice: Commercial Arbitration and
the Civil Justice System, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 578, 582 (1999).
64. See Heidi Shierholz, Correcting the Record, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 1, 2017),
https://www.epi.org/publication/correcting-the-record-consumers-fare-better-under-classactions-than-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/8MG5-A3MA] (noting consumers pay, on average,
$161 to file an arbitration claim).
65. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15; Daniel E.
Lazaroff, Entry Barriers and Contemporary Antitrust Litigation, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 1,
46–51 (2006).
66. Lazaroff, supra note 65; see also Bartholomew, supra note 10, at 2148.
67. Redefining Prey, supra note 19, at 745–46.
68. See Coffee & Paulovic, supra note 1 (“[F]or better or worse, it is today clear that the
tide has turned against class certification, and new barriers have arisen across a variety of
contexts where formerly class certification had seemed automatic.”).
69. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
70. Id. at 23(b)(3) (“[A] class action [must be] superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”).
71. Id. (“[Q]uestions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members . . . .”).
72. Superiority has five factors. The first, “alternative methods,” considers “other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” See, e.g., In re
Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 527 (3d Cir. 2004). The remaining four are
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Tomes have been devoted to each of these requirements. The focus here, though,
is instances where courts import unstated additional constraints into Rule 23,
allegedly to cure inefficiency, shelter defendants,73 or even protect class members.74
These judicially created reforms provide new grounds for denying class certification
for swaths of antitrust cases. Consider manageability and predominance issues by
way of example.
Some courts rewrite manageability to add a new requirement: “ascertainability”—
a term that appears nowhere in Rule 23.75 Despite courts adopting different
interpretations,76 in application, this new barrier is particularly fatal for small-sum
cases.77 It allows courts to deny certification if a case might raise logistical challenges
“ascertaining” whether putative class members purchased the product at issue.78
In addition, some courts reinterpret manageability as a de facto prohibition on
multistate class actions because of the thorny horizontal choice of law queries they

the individuals’ interests, pending litigation, forum, and manageability. FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(3)(A)–(D).
73. See In re Thalomid & Revlimid Antitrust Litig., No. 14-6997, 2018 WL 6573118, at
*19 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2018) (ensuring “a defendant’s rights are protected by the class action
mechanism” (quoting City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am. Inc., 867 F.3d 434,
439 (3d Cir. 2017))); see also In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 319 F.R.D.
158, 174 (E.D. Pa. 2016); Blakes v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., No. 11 CV 336, 2013 WL 6662831, at
*16 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2013).
74. See, e.g., In re Fresh Del Monte Pineapples Antitrust Litig., No. 1:04-MD-1628, 2008
WL 5661873, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2008) (applying rigid predominance requirement to
“benefit injured Class Members” (citation omitted)).
75. See Erin L. Geller, The Fail-Safe Class as an Independent Bar to Class Certification,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2778 (2013) (discussing this implicit requirement).
76. Stephanie Haas, Class is in Session: The Third Circuit Heightens Ascertainability
with Rigor in Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 59 VILL. L. REV. 793, 804–05 (2014) (describing
ascertainability’s “malleable” nature). Courts might demand plaintiffs (1) identify class
members “using objective criteria,” (2) capture all members necessary to resolve the action in
a single proceeding, and/or (3) describe the main claims and defenses that apply to the class.
Id. at 804.
77. See, e.g., Mullins v. Direct Digit., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015) (requiring
ascertainability “bar[s] class actions where class treatment is often most needed: in cases
involving relatively low-cost goods or services”); see also Christine P. Bartholomew, The
Failed Superiority Experiment, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1348 (2016) (explaining
ascertainability).
78. See, e.g., Stewart v. Beam Glob. Spirits & Wine, Inc., No. 11-5149, 2014 WL
2920806, at *7 (D.N.J. June 27, 2014); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir.
2013); Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742, 2010 WL 3119452, at *13
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010).
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raise.79 Multistate claims are common in antitrust class actions.80 Generally, only
consumers who purchased directly from an alleged wrongdoer have standing under
the Sherman Act.81 Over thirty states have enacted indirect purchaser statutes,
affording indirect purchasers standing to vindicate state antitrust laws.82 A single
antitrust indirect purchaser case frequently includes claims under many of these state
statutes. The more states involved, the greater the potential for redress and
deterrence. But depending on which manageability standard a court employs, the
more state claims involved, the riskier class certification becomes.83
Class certification reforms are not limited to manageability. Courts are also
effectively amending Rule 23’s predominance requirement. Rule 23(b)(3) requires
courts to ensure that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members.”84 The prevailing judicial
approach had been to infer class-wide impact for price-fixing cases.85 Now, many
courts require common proof across the class to calculate damages86—even if other

79. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012,
1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Because these claims must be adjudicated under the law of so many
jurisdictions, a single nationwide class is not manageable.”); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc.,
249 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing manageability concerns with a nationwide case);
Lichoff v. CSX Transp., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 564, 574 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (noting applying six
states’ laws “would make it burdensome to instruct a jury on the legal standards for plaintiffs’
claims”); see also James E. Pfander, The Substance and Procedure of Class Action Reform,
93 ILL. BAR J. 144, 144 (2005) (differing state substantive laws “often persuade[] federal
judges to reject nationwide class treatment as unwieldy”).
80. CAFA pushed more nationwide classes into federal courts. Class Action Fairness Act,
Pub. L. 109–2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
While some antitrust class actions still proceed in state court, this Article focuses on federal
actions.
81. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728 (1977) (holding indirect purchasers
cannot seek monetary damages because they lack a cognizable antitrust injury).
82. Edward D. Cavanaugh, Illinois Brick: A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 17 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 19 (2004).
83. Compare, e.g., In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Antitrust Litig., 299 F.R.D. 555 (E.D.
Tenn. 2014), with In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 220 F.R.D. 672 (S.D. Fla.
2004). Both involved overlapping state antitrust law claims for alleged interference with the
entry of a generic drug. Both were brought by indirect purchasers with multistate claims. In
the Tennessee case, the court denied certification, holding a nationwide case would require
application of the law of multiple states, thus “render[ing] this class simply unmanageable.”
Metaxalone, 299 F.R.D. at 588. In the Florida case, though, the court granted certification,
noting the variation “does not pose a manageability problem because the applicable
substantive laws are virtually identical in their required elements.” Terazosin, 220 F.R.D. at
700 n.45.
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
85. See, e.g., In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1254 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing
cases).
86. See, e.g., Bhasker v. Kemper Cas. Insur. Co., 361 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1099 (D.N.M.
2019) (“[E]ven if the methodology for calculating damages is common to the class, the court
must decide whether it will operate in a consistent way for each individual class member.”).
This approach traces its roots to Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013). There, the
Court reversed certification of section 1 and 2 claims against Comcast because of a faulty
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legal or factual issues predominate.87 Any inference of impact is disappearing,
replaced instead with an exacting standard poorly suited for the challenges of
antitrust economic modeling.88
The judicial reforms to manageability and predominance alone have the potential
to chill private antitrust enforcement by incorrectly denying class certification. The
heightened pleading requirements post-Twiqbal coupled with the pro-arbitration
shift exacerbate these worries. As the next Section explains, the process for judicial
approval of antitrust settlements provides much-needed information to evaluate if
such concerns are warranted.
B. Using Settlements to Assess Reforms
The idea that anti-class action sentiment has driven procedural reforms is well
known. The impact of these reforms and the legitimacy of their justifications for
private antitrust enforcement is not. This Section explains how the settlement
approval process is a rich source of data on these questions.
1. Settlement Approval
Despite a “strong judicial policy in favor of settlements, particularly in the class
action context,”89 Rule 23(e) requires the parties submit detailed information to
justify settlement approval.90 Courts must assess “the fairness, reasonableness and

damages model. See id. at 35. Only in dicta does the court mention common proof for
quantifying damages across the class. See id. at 33. As the dissent notes, “[T]he decision
should not be read to require, as a prerequisite to certification, that damages attributable to a
classwide injury be measurable ‘on a class-wide basis.’” Id. at 41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
87. See, e.g., Hughes v. Ester C. Co., 320 F.R.D. 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); Hadley v. Kellogg
Sales Co., 324 F. Supp. 3d 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
88. See Bartholomew, supra note 10, at 2166 (explaining how such an approach “fails to
acknowledge valid disagreement amongst economists”).
89. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 116 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
In re PaineWebber Ltd. P’ships Litig., 147 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1998)).
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). This approval process applies to putative and certified class
actions. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH § 21.612 (2004) (defining “settlement
class” as “cases certified as class actions solely for settlement”)). The primary difference
between a settlement class and litigation class is for (b)(3) classes. See Amchem Prods., Inc.
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997) (noting manageability is irrelevant for a settlement
(b)(3) class).

367408-ILJ 97-4_Text.indd 246

6/15/22 12:59 PM

2022]

ANTITRUST CLASS ACTIONS

1329

adequacy of the settlement terms”91 and have significant discretion92 to accept, reject,
and alter settlements.93
Settlement review has two phases: preliminary and final approval.94 Between the
two stages, the parties provide any requisite notice to class members.95 The notice
details the settlement terms, the claims process if any, and how to object or opt out
of the settlement.96 By the final approval, the court has additional information from
the claims process, such as the reach of the class notice, the number of claims made
to date, any objections, and any opt outs.97
At both approval stages,98 courts consider substance and process. Substantively,
a proposed settlement must provide adequate relief.99 This case-specific
determination considers:
(1) the case’s complexity, expense, and likely duration;
(2) class members’ reaction to the settlement;
(3) the stage of the proceedings;

91. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 330 F.R.D. 11,
27 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (citation omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(C).
92. Settlement approval is discretionary. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Nat’l City Bank, 726 F.3d
372, 377 (3d Cir. 2013); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir.
2008) (“The trial court, well-positioned to decide which facts and legal arguments are most
important to each Rule 23 requirement, possesses broad discretion to control proceedings and
frame issues for consideration under Rule 23.” (citation omitted)). Courts may consider class
counsel’s settlement recommendations. See, e.g., Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v.
DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 528 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (affording “great weight” to counsel’s
recommendation because they “are most closely acquainted with the facts of the underlying
litigation” (citation omitted)).
93. See, e.g., Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., No. C 11–1726, 2012 WL 5838198, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 17, 2012) (denying preliminary approval); In re Comcast Corp. Set-Top Cable
Television Box Antitrust Litig., No. 09–MD–2034, 2015 WL 6757614, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
5, 2015) (same); Order Granting Final Approval of Indirect Purchaser Settlements, 4:07–cv–
05944, 2016 WL 3648478, at *24 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2016) (discussing judicially required
modifications to a settlement).
94. See, e.g., Spann v. J.C. Penney Corp., 314 F.R.D. 312, 319 (C.D. Cal. 2016); In re
Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Pracs. Litig., 258 F.R.D. 671, 675 (D. Kan. 2009).
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). If the court has certified a (b)(3) class pre-settlement, class
members may have already received certification before receiving any settlement notice. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (c)(2). Also, the defendant must notify certain state and federal officials of
a settlement. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b).
96. See DAVID F. HERR, ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.633 (4th
ed.); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812–14 (1985). By opting out, a
class member loses standing to object to the settlement. See, e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust
Litig., 282 F.R.D. 92, 110 (D.N.J. 2012).
97. See 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:41 (5th ed. 2020)
(detailing the final approval submissions).
98. If the court preliminarily approved a settlement class, it completes certification during
final approval. See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 527 (3d Cir.
2004); In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
99. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(A) (“The parties must provide the court with information
sufficient to enable it to determine whether to give notice of the proposal to the class.”).

367408-ILJ 97-4_Text.indd 247

6/15/22 12:59 PM

1330

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 97:1315

(4) the amount of discovery completed;
(5) the risks of establishing liability and damages;
(6) the risks of maintaining the class through the trial;
(7) defendants’ ability to withstand a greater judgment;
(8) whether the settlement is reasonable compared to the best possible
recovery; and
(9) whether the settlement is reasonable given the future litigation
risks.100
The parties’ showings on these factors help evaluate the legitimacy of private
antitrust enforcement criticisms. For example, to aid the court’s analysis of the case’s
complexity, settlement approval papers detail the similarities and differences
between any existing government investigation. This information exposes whether
private enforcement merely duplicates government enforcement.
Procedurally, a court confirms the settlement was the product of arm’s-length
negotiations. A proposed settlement cannot jeopardize class members’ due process
rights by benefiting counsel over the class.101 This requirement sheds light on
whether sweetheart deals are myth or fact. Courts assess any conflict between class
members or with the class representative.102 If the parties undertook “meaningful
discovery” prior to settling and relied on a mediator to reach consensus,103 courts
generally presume the settlement was at arm’s length in the absence of any
demonstrative conflict.104 Nonetheless, courts closely analyze the parties’ proposed
distribution of settlement funds and any side agreements that may impact the
settlement.105
These substantive and procedural dimensions mean settlement approvals also
expose the effect of procedural reforms. Settlement approval papers extensively

100. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2); see also, e.g., Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir.
1975); City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 954 F. Supp. 2d 276,
279 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
101. See, e.g., Gooch v. Life Invs. Ins. Co., 672 F.3d 402, 420 (6th Cir. 2012) (explaining
collateral estoppel turns on “whether that settlement complied with the Due Process Clause”
(citation omitted)).
102. Cf. D’Amato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F.3d 78, 85 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] court-appointed
mediator’s involvement in pre-certification settlement negotiations helps to ensure that the
proceedings were free of collusion and undue pressure.” (citation omitted)); Fernandez v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., No. 15–22782, 2017 WL 10775413, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 29, 2017) (same), report and recommendation adopted, No. 15–22782, 2017 WL
10775412 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2017).
103. E.g., Mba v. World Airways, Inc., 369 F. App’x 194, 197 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., No. 99-079, 2003 WL 22037741,
at *2 (D.D.C. June 16, 2003).
104. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(D) (requiring the settlement “treats class members
equitably relative to each other”).
105. See id. at 23(e)(2)(C)(ii)–(iii). Such side deals may be between counsel or with
objectors. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 330 (E.D. Pa. 1994),
vacated on other grounds, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’d Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591 (1997) (class counsel and defendants); Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors:
Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 436 (2003)
(objectors).
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detail procedural hurdles—both completed and yet to come—for the given case.
Coupling this data with information from fee award requests provides a holistic
imprint of the modern antitrust class action.
2. Fees and Costs Requests
The attorney fee approval process provides even more data points to assess the
need for and the impact of procedural reforms. After issuing final approval, courts
resolve any fee106 and cost award requests.107 These requests supplement the
settlement approval file, providing specifics about the time and expense devoted to
the private enforcement effort.
Class counsel usually request a percentage of the settlement fund as attorney
fees.108 Courts frequently cross-check this percentage by referencing class counsels’
lodestar, which is the total hours that class counsel devoted to the case multiplied by
a reasonable compensation rate.109 The percentage awarded is based on multiple
factors:110
(1) any benchmark percentage in the circuit;111
(2) the size of the fund and the number of class members;
(3) class counsels’ skill, experience, and efficiency;
(4) the case’s complexity and duration;
(5) the risks of the litigation;
(6) the amount of time class counsel devoted to the case;
(7) awards in similar cases; and
(8) public policy considerations.112

106. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(iii).
107. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
108. The common fund doctrine allows attorneys to request fees, usually a percentage of
the fund, from the settlement. See Tyler W. Hill, Note, Financing the Class: Strengthening the
Class Action Through Third-Party Investment, 125 YALE L.J. 484, 511 (2015). For settlements
that do not create a common fund, courts tend to use the lodestar method to calculate fees. See,
e.g., In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011). The Clayton
Act also provides fee-shifting for a prevailing party. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
109. The compensation rate reflects the average hourly rate in the same geographic area as
the pending case for similar work. See, e.g., In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM)
Antitrust Litig., No. M–02–1486, 2013 WL 12387371, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013). Courts
then adjust this product using a multiplier. See, e.g., In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg.,
Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 2672 CRB (JSC), 2017 WL 1352859, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 12, 2017); cf. Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co., 901 F. Supp. 294, 298 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (“Multipliers in the 3–4 range are common in lodestar awards for lengthy and complex
class action litigation.” (citation omitted)).
110. These factors vary slightly by circuit. Compare In re UnitedHealth Group Inc. PSLRA
Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1104 (D. Minn. 2009) (listing seven factors), with In re Diet
Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., 582 F.3d 524, 541 (3d Cir. 2009) (adding three additional factors).
111. See, e.g., In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 350 (N.D. Ga.
1993) (“‘The majority of common fund fee awards fall between 20% and 30% of the fund,’
with an upper limit of 50%.” (citation omitted)).
112. See, e.g., In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., No. 1:13–MD–2472, 2020 WL
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In applying these factors, courts have discretion to determine when class counsel
deserves a significant award—and when they do not.113 The results reveal whether
class action critiques are creeping into fee and cost awards.
3. Settlement Objections
While settlement and fee approval filings help gauge the impact of prior
procedural reforms, settlement objections hint at future ones. Before a final approval
or fee request hearing, a class member may voice their views by filing an objection.114
Courts will consider any challenges that “state with specificity the grounds for the
objection.”115 Baseless claims are insufficient.116 A large number of challenges may
indicate an organized campaign by objectors rather than any legitimate problem with
the settlement or fee request.117 Consequently, courts focus more on the content than
the number of objections.118
The right to challenge a proposed class settlement has spurred a niche specialty:
attorneys representing repeat objectors.119 These professional objectors “file
objections, or threaten to file objections, to class action settlements without the aim
of improving the settlement at all.”120 They include individual attorneys from smaller

4038942, at *6 (D.R.I. July 17, 2020); Hooker v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 4:13–CV–003,
2017 WL 4484258, at *6 (E.D. Va. May 11, 2017).
113. See, e.g., In re Samsung Top-Load Washing Mach. Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab.
Litig., 997 F.3d 1077, 1091 (10th Cir. 2021); Kamar v. Radio Shack Corp., 623 F. App'x 902,
903 (9th Cir. 2015).
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5); see Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 10-CV14360, 2016 WL 4475011, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2016) (discussing how class members
“have a voice as objectors”).
115. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5)(A).
116. See, e.g., In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 322 F.R.D. 276, 291 (E.D. Mich. 2017)
(“Courts respect the integrity of counsel and presume the absence of fraud or collusion in
negotiating the settlement, unless evidence to the contrary is offered.” (citation omitted)); Int’l
Union v. Ford Motor Co., No. 05–74730, 2006 WL 1984363, at *26 (E.D. Mich. July 13,
2006) (“Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion unless there is evidence to the
contrary.” (citation omitted)).
117. See Bruce D. Greenberg, Keeping the Flies Out of the Ointment: Restricting Objectors
to Class Action Settlements, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 949, 952 (2010) (“[P]rofessional objectors
simply present the same ‘canned’ objections again and again, often copying them verbatim
from case to case regardless of their appropriateness.”).
118. See Jones v. Singing River Health Servs. Found., 865 F.3d 285, 300 (5th Cir. 2017)
(“At the end of the day, it is not the number of Objectors but the quality of their objections
that should guide the court’s review.”).
119. See John E. Lopatka & D. Brooks Smith, Class Action Professional Objectors: What
to Do About Them?, 39 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 865, 866 (2012) (discussing the “rise to a cottage
industry of so-called professional objectors”).
120. Jonathan Uslaner & Brandon Marsh, Combating Objectionable Objections, ABA
LITIG. GRP. (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/classactions/articles/2016/how-to-combat-objectionable-objections/
[https://perma.cc/R8SQCREY]. This Article uses the term “professional objector” to acknowledge “the fact that
certain objectors are represented by attorneys who are in the profession of objecting to class
action settlements, whether motivated by views of the law, ideology, or otherwise.” Dewey v.
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shops and attorneys from nonprofit, purported public interest firms with differing
motivations. For some, the potential for financial gain spurs objections. These
professional objectors threaten to hold a class settlement hostage until they receive
compensation from class counsel to withdraw their challenge—a process sometimes
called “greenmailing.”121 Others hope for compensation for altering the settlement.
Courts, however, only award objectors whose challenge is a substantial cause of a
benefit on the class.122 In evaluating an objector fee request, courts consider a variety
of factors, including whether the objector was “substantively involved in the
litigation.”123 If a challenge is unsuccessful, the objector may opt out of the
settlement, file a claim, or appeal. By opting out or making a claim, the objector loses
standing to appeal. For other professional objectors, reform is the driving impetus. A
close examination of these objections can forecast what future hazards await the
already “reformed” antitrust class action.
II. THE MODERN ANTITRUST CLASS ACTION
With this background in place, Part II analyzes modern antitrust class actions. To
weigh the consequences of a decade-plus of reforms requires an informed rendering
of private enforcement efforts. The skeleton for this depiction is a wholly original
dataset comprised of federal antitrust class action settlements from the year of
CAFA’s enactment through its fifteenth anniversary (March 2005–2020).124 It

Volkswagen, 909 F. Supp. 2d 373, 396 n.24 (D.N.J. 2012).
121. See, e.g., Michael J. Bologna, Notorious ‘Serial Objector’ May Have Filed his List
Objection, BLOOMBERG L., https://news.bloomberglaw.com/class-action/notorious-serialobjector-may-have-filed-his-last-objection-1 [https://perma.cc/K9L3-N3EX] (Mar. 12, 2019,
11:42 AM).
122. See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 424 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2005)
(requiring objection be a “a substantial cause of the benefit obtained” (quoting Savoie v.
Merchants Bank, 84 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1996)); In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 169
F. Supp. 3d 719, 720 (N.D. Ohio 2016) (denying fee request because objector “was not
meaningfully responsible for any monetary benefit obtained by the class” (emphasis in
original)); Glasser v. Volkswagen, Inc., 645 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 2011).
123. E.g., Dewey, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 398–99 (“In deciding whether an objector deserves
an incentive award, courts have considered whether: (1) the objector’s particular efforts
conferred a benefit on the class; (2) the objector incurred personal risk; and/or (3) the objector
was substantively involved in the litigation.” (citation omitted)), aff’d Dewey v. Volkswagen
Akteingesellschaft, 558 F. App’x 191 (3d Cir. 2014).
124. These opinions were the result of the following Bloomberg search: Sources: All Court
Dockets, All U.S. District Court Antitrust & Trade Opinions, Search Term: ((final /3 approval)
AND ((class n/3 action))), Content Type: Court Opinions. This docket search generated a more
robust compilation than similar Lexis and Westlaw searches. Material from Westlaw and
webpages devoted to class settlements, including topclassactions.com, classaction.org, and
consumer-action.org, were then added to the Bloomberg results. Once compiled, I grouped
related cases to avoid double counting, deleted any non-antitrust, non-class entries, and
settlement denials. Except where noted, all charts and tables are based on data from final
approval motions, fee and cost award requests, and all related dockets and orders for each
settled case. The exhaustive nature of the compilation minimizes the potential influence of
missing settlements.
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includes evidence extracted from 393 reported and unreported final approval
opinions, as well as motion practice for each settled case. Figures from fee and costs
award motions flesh out the data.125 All told, the dataset spans 171 cases126 and 1328
settlements.127
The resulting analysis exposes the impact of repeated procedural blows. Section
A starts with a macro assessment of private antitrust enforcement. This bird’s-eye
view initially shows antitrust class actions’ perseverance, despite ever-increasing
procedural hurdles. But a deeper dive shows a more precarious image—one where
decades of reforms have significantly narrowed the primary method of antitrust
oversight.
A. Skin-Deep Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement
At first glance, antitrust enforcement appears healthy. Isolated data suggests these
class actions have successfully navigated the last decade’s reforms. These positives,
though incomplete on their own, are still worth recognition. Further, the settlement
data refutes a core criticism of private antitrust enforcement: class actions do not
simply “piggyback” on government oversight, and they can be complementary to
such oversight.
Class actions continue to enforce antitrust laws. Both the volume of final
approvals and value of settlements increased over the studied period. The number of
final approvals grew at an average annual rate of 10.31%. The number of final
approvals exceeding $100 million increased three-fold during the second half of the
study.128 Consumers reaped the benefits, as settlement amounts also increased over

125. Final approval orders exceeded fee and costs awards, as counsel did not always
request such an award from each settlement.
126. Because piecemeal settlements were common, final approval decisions far exceeded
the number of settled cases. See, e.g., Docket, In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig.,
1:06-mc-01775 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2006) (six final approvals); Docket, In re Nexium
(Esomperazole) Antitrust Litig., 1:12-cv-02409 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2012) (five final approvals).
127. Many final approval orders involved settlements with multiple defendants. Hence, the
dataset tracked the total number of defendants per final approval order. The term “settlement”
as used herein reflects these individual settlements. The number of settlements is likely
unrepresentative because related business entities are combined. If, for example, a parent
company and its subsidiary settled, the data reflects that as a single defendant.
128. This figure does not include injunctive, declaratory, or nonmonetary settlements.
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time. These settlements afforded consumers over $32.05 billion in compensatory
relief,129 in addition to nonmonetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief.130
Figure A: Final Approvals Exceeding $100 Million
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Settlements spanned various industries, evincing private antitrust enforcement’s
regulatory oversight across diverse segments of the U.S. economy.131 Most antitrust
settlements over the last fifteen years involved pharmaceuticals,132 food products,133

129. This figure represents settlement funds available to class members, net attorney fees,
and costs. It is does not reflect potential adjustments for claims administration or interest
accrued post-settlement approval. When adjusted for inflation per the 2019 Consumer Price
Index, this amount grows to $34,214,133,925.71.
130. Not all settlement approvals provided valuations of such relief. See, e.g., Order, Binz
v. Amadeus, No. 1:15-cv-05457 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2018). The limited information available
suggests its value is significant. See, e.g., Talone v. Am. Osteopathic Ass’n, No. 1:16-cv04644, 2018 WL 6318371 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2018) (valuing injunctive relief settlement at $84
million); Memorandum Opinion, In re Ovcan Oral Contraceptive Antitrust Litig., No. 06–401
(D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2007) (settlement providing $6 million in products).
131. The data showed that the majority of the cases studied were price fixing, market
manipulation, and bid rigging. Price fixing consisted of 81.9% of total recovery and 70.5% of
settlements, while market manipulation consisted of 11.1% of total recovery and 13.7% of
settlements, and bid rigging consisted of 7.5% of total recovery and 14.9% of settlements.
132. See, e.g., Order Granting Final Approval, In re Solodyn (Minocycline Hydrochloride)
Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2503, No. 1:14-MD-2503, 2017 WL 5710424 (D. Mass. Nov. 27,
2017); Order Granting Final Approval, In re Wellbutrin Xl Antitrust Litig., No. 2:08-cv02431, 2012 WL 13224382 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2012); Order Granting Final Approval, In re KDur Antitrust Litig., No. 01-cv-1652 MDL No. 1419, 2017 WL 11636125 (D.N.J. Oct. 5,
2017).
133. See, e.g., In re Processed Egg Prod. Antitrust Litig., 302 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pa. 2014);
Memorandum Opinion & Order, In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., No. 2:08-MD-1000, 2013 WL
2155379 (E.D. Tenn. May 17, 2013); Order, Edwards v. Nat’l Milk Producers Fed’n, No. 11cv-04766, 2017 WL 3616638 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017).
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and electronics,134 with the largest settlements coming from financial industries.135

I

I

Table 1: Recovery & Settlements by Industry

Industry
(representative examples)

Recovery

% of
Settlements

Finance
(derivatives, futures, banking & credit card services)

39.4%

7. 8%

Electronics
(cable services, flat panels & memory chips)

14.7%

13 .0%

Medical/Pharmaceutical
(drugs & medical products)

12.6%

17.8%

Chemicals/Gas
(plastic additives, rubbers, gasoline & natural gas)

8.1%

9.7%

Cars
(manufacturing & parts)

6.6%

15.0%

5.6%

5.2%

Consumer
(clothings, services & merchandise)

3.5%

7.5%

Construction Materials
(concrete, gypsum, pipe fittings & steel products)

3.0%

6.3%

Food
(eggs, fish, mushrooms & bananas)

2.6%

13.4%

Miscellaneous

3.9%

4.4%

Transportation
(air & freight services)

% of Total

134. See, e.g., In re Optical Disk Drive Prods. Antitrust Litig., 959 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir.
2020); Order Granting Final Approval, In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No.
CV-07-44-SC (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2012); Order Granting in Part Motion for Attorney’s Fees
and Granting Motion for Settlement, In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD02420, 2020 WL 7264559 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2020).
135. Four of the five largest final approvals, all exceeding $590 million, involved the
financial industry. See Order, Dahl v. Bain Cap. Partners, No. 1:07-cv-12388 (D. Mass. Mar.
2, 2015); Corrected Opinion and Order, In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No.
13md2476, 2016 WL 2731524 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2016); Order Awarding Reimbursement of
Litigation Expenses, In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., No. 1:13-cv07789-LGS (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2018); Order, In re Payment Card Interchange Fee &
Merchant Disc. Antitrust Litig., No. 05-MD-1720 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2019).
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Vigorous private enforcement requires attorneys willing to undertake these
complex cases.136 Attorney fee awards are intended to incentivize suits.137 Class
counsel earned over $6.7 billion. The average fee rate was 27.6%, with percentages
varying notably by circuit.
Table 2: Aggregate Data by Circuit

I

DI

I

Circuit

Final
Approvals

1st Cir.
2d Cir.
3d Cir.
4th Cir.
5th Cir.
6th Cir.
7th Cir.
8th Cir.
9th Cir.
10th Cir.
11th Cir.
D.C. Cir.

17
69
94
7
4
44
27
4
105
6
11
5

Total

I

393

I

Mean
Fee %
29.1%
22.2%
30.7%
29.2%
18.9%
27.5%
32.5%
30.1%
26.4%
32.5%
31.3%
29.2%
27.60%

I

Sum of Settlements
(millions)
$1,119.54
$15,212.93
$2,951.75
$692.81
$18.55
$3,064.22
$1,178.18
$32.25
$6,458.47
$967.00
$259.67
$103.00
$32,058.38

I

I

Sum of Fees
(millions)
$316.53
$2,247.43
$947.19
$231.42
$0.47
$715.73
$346.03
$9.60
$1,534.74
$320.55
$57.43
$15.39
$6,742.50

I

Sum of Costs
(millions)
$41.56
$186.90
$140.57
$14.47
$5.61
$78.45
$23.10
$2.65
$130.33
$8.69
$8.17
$4.00
$644.51

I

I

From a perfunctory review of the dockets for each settled case, procedural reforms
seem to have had minimal repercussions. Overall, the rates at which courts granted
motions to dismiss and class certification held steady across the studied period,138

136. Hunt v. Imperial Merch. Servs., No. C–05–04993, 2010 WL 3958726, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 7, 2010) (“[I]n order to encourage private enforcement of the law . . . Congress has
legislated that in certain cases prevailing parties may recover their attorneys’ fees from the
opposing side.” (quoting Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008));
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proc. in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 520 F. Supp. 635, 652 (D.
Minn. 1981) (“The policy of Section 4 requires that the antitrust defendants pay the successful
plaintiff’s attorneys a reasonable fee in order to encourage attorneys to act as private attorneysgeneral in enforcing the antitrust laws.”).
137. Cf. Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 481 F.2d 1045, 1050 (2d Cir. 1973)
(“In the absence of adequate attorneys’ fee awards, many antitrust actions would not be
commenced, since the claims of individual litigants, when taken separately, often hardly
justify the expense of litigation.”); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 1261, Civ.A.
98–5055, 2004 WL 1221350, at *17 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2004) (“[T]he incentive for ‘the private
attorney general’ is particularly important in the area of antitrust enforcement because public
policy relies so heavily on such private action for enforcement of the antitrust laws.”),
amended by MDL No. 1261, Civ.A.98–5055, Civ.A.99–1341, 2004 WL 1240775 (E.D. Pa.
June 4, 2004).
138. Motion to dismiss analytics are the product of the following WestlawNext search:
Case Type: Antitrust, Toggle: Include Multi-District Litigation, Order Date: 1/1/2005 –
3/31/2020, Motion Type: Motions to Dismiss, Court: Federal, Case Type: Class Action. The
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despite dramatic annual fluctuations.139 For the fifteen-year period post-CAFA,
courts granted roughly 50.3% of motions to dismiss in antitrust class actions.140 This
figure is on par with dismissal rates in federal contract cases and lower than civil
rights, employment discrimination, and financial instrument cases.141 Similarly,
despite stricter certification requirements, class certification rates improved
marginally over the study. Class counsel either exercised more successful case
selection strategies142 or circumnavigated more rigid ascertainability and choice of
law requirements.143

80%

Figure B: Class Certifications & Motion to Dismiss
Grant Rates
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Motion to Dismiss Trend

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

20%
Class Certification Grant Rate
Class Certification Trend

class certification search term is: Case Type: Antitrust, Toggle: Include Multi-District
Litigation, Order Date: 1/1/2005–3/31/2020, Motion Type: Motion to Certify Class, Court:
Federal, Case Type: Class Action. Motions granted and granted in part are grouped, as are
motions denied, denied as moot, and struck.
139. Fluctuations are mostly a product of the small data set for such motions.
140. See, e.g., In re Pork Antitrust Litig., 495 F. Supp. 3d 753 (D. Minn. 2020);
Georgandellis v. Holzer Clinic, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-626, 2009 WL 1585772, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
June 5, 2009); Stand Energy Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 380 F. Supp. 2d 748,
750 (S.D. W. Va. 2005), modified on reconsideration in part, No. Civ.A. 2:04-0867, 2006 WL
162988 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 20, 2006).
141. See JOE S. CECIL, GEORGE W. CORT, MARGARET S. WILLIAMS & JARED J. BATAILLON,
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL (2011),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/motioniqbal_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z3BX6YR9] (providing comparative figures).
142. See Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in
Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 285 (2011) (connecting
procedural standards to attorney litigation strategies).
143. See, e.g., In re Restasis (Cyclosporine Ophthalmic Emulsion) Antitrust Litig., 335
F.R.D. 1, 10 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (granting certification despite ascertainability and predominance
challenges); Cole’s Wexford Hotel, Inc. v. UPMC & Highmark, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 3d 387,
412 (W.D. Pa. 2015); In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (same).
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As the next Section discusses, these preliminary procedural findings are deeply
qualified. One unequivocal finding, though, exposes critical fallacies with critiques
that antitrust class actions merely “piggyback” on government cases.144 The actual
interplay between private and government enforcement is more nuanced. Private
enforcement did overlap with DOJ and FTC investigations, particularly for section 1
claims;145 however, during the studied period, the reach of antitrust class actions
exceeded government enforcement. Class actions often expanded the scope of
wrongdoing,146 the amount of recovery,147 or the number of defendants involved.148
Such cases also took the lead on many investigations over the last fifteen years. In

144. See supra Part I.A (discussing class action criticisms).
145. See, e.g., Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Their Settlement
with the Home City Ice Company, In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., No. 08-MD-01952 (E.D.
Mich. June 6, 2017) (discussing coordination government action); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of
Law in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Proposed Settlement Agreements with (1)
Virginia Harbor Services, Inc., Fentek Marine Systems GMBH, Robert B. Taylor, and Donald
Murray; (2) Marine Fenders International and Gerald Thermos; (3) Waterman Supply Co., Inc.
and Seymour Waterman; and (4) Maritime International, Inc. and John Deats, Ace Marine
Rigging & Supply v. Va. Harbor Servs, Inc., No. SACV1100436-GW (FFMx) (C.D. Cal. Dec.
5, 2011).
146. See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Reimbursement of
Expenses, and Incentive Award, In re Anadarko Basin Oil & Gas Lease Antitrust Litig., No.
CIV-16-209-HE (W.D. Okla. Apr. 25, 2019); Corrected Memorandum in Support of Class
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Settlement Approval and Award of Attorneys’ Fees,
Reimbursement of Expenses, and Incentive Payments, In re Schagringas Co. v. BP Prods.,
No. 1:06-CV-3621 (E.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2009); Notice of Motion, In re Liquid Aluminum Sulfate
Antitrust Litig., No. 16-md-2687 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2018); Opinion & Order Granting Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement, In re Auto. Parts Antitrust Litig., No. 12-md-02311
(E.D. Mich. June 20, 2016).
147. See, e.g., Indirect-Purchaser Class Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees and Incentive Awards, In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. 3:07md-1827 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2012); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Joint Petition for
Final Approval of Settlement, Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses, and Incentive Awards,
In re BP Propane Indirect Purchasers Antitrust Litig., No. 06-C-3541 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2010)
(limited compensation in prior government action).
148. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Approval of Proposed Plan of Distribution of Settlement
Funds, Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses, and Award of Class
Representatives’ Incentive Awards, In re Ready Mix Concrete Antitrust Litig., No. 1:05-cv00979 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 3, 2019); Plaintiffs’ Fourth Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and
Reimbursement of Expenses, In re Marine Hose Antitrust Litig., No. 08-MDL-1888, at 3–4
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2011) (“[T]he United States Department of Justice (‘DOJ’) explicitly
forewent restitution for the cartel’s victims in light of the pendency of this action.”); Notice of
Motion, Motion, and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Quantegy Recording Sols., LLC v. Toda Kogyo Corp., No. C02-1611 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2008); Notice of Motion, Motion and Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees,
Reimbursement of Expenses, and Class Representative Incentive Awards, In re DRAM
Antitrust Litig., No. M-02-1486 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2007) (fewer defendants in government
proceeding).
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some instances, the government investigated an industry but took no further action.149
In others, the class action was the only investigation or litigation.150
Sometimes, it was the government agency riding class counsel’s coattails.
Consider In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation, in which class counsel’s
significant achievement was despite government action—not due to it. Direct and
indirect purchasers alleged a price-fixing conspiracy in the flat panel industry.151 The
DOJ did not indict any of the defendants until over a year into the class action.152
When it did prosecute, the agency relied heavily on the extensive discovery gathered
by class counsel, and eventually reached amnesty deals, plea agreements, and
findings of guilt against all the defendants. In return, however, the DOJ provided
little aid to the pending consumer claims. It did not seek restitution for a single
victim. It did not elicit any admissions of indirect purchaser liability. Nor did it
require the defendants to concede their wrongdoing harmed purchasers.153 Rather,
the DOJ made statements to the Court suggesting the indirect purchasers’ case theory
was flawed.154 It even prolonged the litigation, agreeing with defendants to
successfully push for a stay of merits discovery.155 For class members, the
government action was more of an albatross than an aid.

149. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Class Counsels’ Motion for an Award
of Attorneys’ Fees and the Reimbursement of Expenses, In re Carbon Black Antitrust Litig.,
No. 03-10191, at 15 (D. Mass. Sept. 11, 2007) (discussing how DOJ “had closed their
investigations of the defendants”); Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion for Final Approval of
Settlement with All Defendants, Approval of Plan of Distribution, and Certification of
Settlement Class, In re Credit Default Swaps Antitrust Litig., No. 13 Md. 2476 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
1, 2016).
150. See, e.g., Class Plaintiff’s: (1) Notice of Motion, Motion for, and Memorandum in
Support of Approval of Attorneys’ Fees as Reasonable and (2) Responses to Objectors on Fee
Issues, Hemphill v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, Inc., No. 04-CV-1495 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 25,
2005); Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees,
Reimbursement of Expenses and Class Representative Incentive Awards; Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, In re Transpacific Passenger Air Antitrust Litig.,
No. 3:07-cv-05634 (N.D. Cal. April 7, 2015); Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees, Expenses, and Service Award, In re Resistors Antitrust Litig., No. 3:15-cv03820 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2019).
151. See Indirect-Purchaser Class Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Attorneys’
Fees and Incentive Awards, In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. 3:07-md-1827
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2012).
152. Id. at 8 n.7 (listing indictment dates).
153. Id. at 8.
154. Id. at 4. As counsel for the indirect purchasers state:
Despite the guilty pleas and admissions, [defendants] contended (heavily
relying on a statement to the Court by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”))
that there were three narrow conspiracies, not one overarching one as the IPPs
alleged, and that none of those conspiracies resulted in any measurable higher
prices even to direct purchasers, much less to end-user individuals and
businesses.
Id.
155. Order Granting United States’ Motion to Stay Discovery, In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel)
Antitrust Litig., No. M 07-01827 SI (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2007).
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These initial findings indicate private antitrust enforcement is persisting and
exceeding the scope of government prosecution. Class actions still provide some
regulatory oversight, disgorging large amounts of money in many industries. The
absolute dollar amounts are staggering, but as the next Section explains, those
isolated figures are deceptive.
B. Blight Below the Surface of Private Antitrust Enforcement
It takes a full diagnosis, grounded in empirical data, to see the damage fifteen
years of procedural reforms has wrought. The settlement data is like the famous My
Wife and My Mother-In-Law picture156—a reversible image where an initial glance
distorts the full depiction. Indeed, settlement and fee awards in these cases are
significant, and the grant rates for key procedural motions look promising. But
focusing on these limited dimensions provides false reassurance.
Enforcement is declining at a time when market concentration is on the rise.157
Since peaking in 2008, antitrust filings have lagged.158 Filings dropped 30% from
2005 to 2019.

1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0

350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
19

20

17

20

15

20

13

20

11

20

09

20

07

20

05

20

Federal Civil Filings

Federal Civil Filings

Federal Antitrust Filings

Figure C: Federal Court Filings
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156. W.E. Hill, My Wife and My Mother-In-Law. They are Both in This Picture-Find Them
(Illustration), LIBRARY OF CONG., (Nov. 6, 1915), https://www.loc.gov/item/2010652001/
[https://perma.cc/F9UL-DY3C].
157. See, e.g., Sean P. Sullivan, Anticompetitive Entrenchment, 68 U. KAN. L. REV. 1133,
1137 (2020) (detailing how seller concentration and market power “have been rising in recent
decades”); David Wessel, Is Lack of Competition Strangling the U.S. Economy?, HARV. BUS.
REV. (2018), https://hbr.org/2018/03/is-lack-of-competition-strangling-the-u-s-economy
[https://perma.cc/P6R6-URG4] (“There’s no question that most industries are becoming more
concentrated.”).
158. Federal antitrust filing data are included as part of the U.S. District Courts’ Federal
Court Management Statistics. See Caseload Statistics Data Tables, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CT.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-statistics-data-tables
[https://perma.cc/2C4S-Q2MF] [hereinafter Caseload Statistics] (data culled from Table C-2
for the U.S. District Courts––Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis of Jurisdiction and Nature of
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Orders consolidating related putative class actions have also declined.159
Government enforcement is not picking up the difference. DOJ and FTC antitrust
suits dropped precipitously in 2015 and have decreased each year since.160

Figure D: Pending MDLs, Federal Antitrust Filings,* &
Federal Enforcement Filings 2013–2019
90
# of Actions
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2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
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Government Filings
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*Federal Antitrust Filings are scaled to a factor of ten.

When compared to global enforcement, this decline suggests gaps in U.S.
competition oversight. Many countries, including Brazil, Australia, and even China,
have adopted more aggressive competition policies during the studied period.161 EU

Suit, During the 12-Month Periods Ending December 31, from 2005–2019, specifically using
the Antitrust field under Nature of Suit).
159. For access to JPML’s annual reports, see Statistical Information, U.S. J.P.M.L.,
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/statistics-info?page=1 [https://perma.cc/3BND-ZF2F].
160. For access to the FTC’s annual highlights, see FTC Annual Reports, FTC,
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/ftc-annual-reports [https://perma.cc/P6ZB6PFN]. The represented FTC figures include filed merger cases, nonmerger actions, and civil
penalty actions. DOJ also produces annual reports. See Public Documents, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations [https://perma.cc/UWC9-645T].
161. See, e.g., Krisztian Katona & Diego Herrera Moraes, Reforms Achieved, but
Challenges Ahead: Brazil’s New Competition Law, 3 INT’L COMM.: ABA SECTION ANTITRUST
L. 11 (2011) (detailing Brazilian antitrust reforms); Press Release, Austl. Competition &
for
Harper
Reforms
(Oct.
25,
2017),
Consumer
Comm’n, Guidance
https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/guidance-for-harper-reforms
[https://perma.cc/D5NQ-RJKG] (detailing new guidelines for regulation of misuse of market
power); THE U.S.-CHINA BUS. COUNCIL, COMPETITION POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA 1
(2014),
https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/AML%202014%20Report%20FINAL_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M5Q9-QHNK] (“China’s increased level of competition enforcement
activity and the high-profile reporting of its competition investigations have prompted growing
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antitrust investigations steadily increased over the last decade,162 including
investigations of U.S. companies.163 If the volume of antitrust class actions continues
to fall, the gulf between U.S. and international antitrust enforcement will likely
widen164—to the detriment of the average American consumer.
A closer look at the data connects procedural reforms to this decline. Arbitration,
class waivers, motions to dismiss, and more rigid class certification requirements are
chipping away at private enforcement.
1. Rising Barricades at the Procedural Gates
Docket analytics show how each procedural reform has altered private antitrust
enforcement. To see the cumulative destructive effect of such reforms requires both
docket and settlement data.
First, more private enforcements end each year before they really begin: the
volume of antitrust class action claims that are dismissed is increasing. Combining
the steady grant rate, the decrease in overall filings, and the increased volume of Rule
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss reveals the negative impact of Twiqbal. Since Twombly,
courts have granted 50.3% of antitrust motions to dismiss, and the volume of such
motions has grown.165 Coupling the steady dismissal rate with this uptick in motions
means an increased annual number of dismissals. While courts frequently grant leave

attention and concern from US companies.”).
162. See European Law Enforcement Against Antitrust Conspiracies—Recent Trends,
JONES DAY (Sept. 2016), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2016/09/european-lawenforcement-against-antitrust-conspiraciesrecent-trends [https://perma.cc/R2X8-9RVR]. For
a more extensive comparison between E.U. and U.S. antitrust enforcement, see generally
DANIEL J. GIFFORD & ROBERT T. KUDRLE, THE ATLANTIC DIVIDE IN ANTITRUST: AN
EXAMINATION OF US AND EU COMPETITION POLICY (2015).
163. See, e.g., Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €1.49
Billion for Abusive Practices in Online Advertising (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_1770 [https://perma.cc/P8M8NZM4]; Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Fines US Chipmaker
Qualcomm €242 Million for Engaging in Predatory Pricing (July 18, 2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_4350 [https://perma.cc/XEH8LVK8].
164. Cf. Clayton Graham, All Hail the European Union: Implications of Microsoft v.
Commission on Global Antitrust Enforcement, 21 GLOB. BUS. & DEV. L.J. 285, 308 (2008)
(“The EU has already taken a more aggressive approach to antitrust regulation than the U.S.”).
165. Analytics for class certification motions are from the following Westlaw search: Case
Type: Antitrust, Toggle: Include Multi-District Litigation, Order Date: 1/1/2005–3/31/2020,
Motion Type: Motion to Dismiss (further defined by Failure to State a Claim), Court: Federal,
Case Type: Class Action. Additionally, motions granted and granted in part were grouped
together. Similarly, motions denied and denied as moot were grouped together.
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to amend, that leave is not guaranteed.166 Once dismissed with prejudice, the
likelihood of any enforcement for the alleged wrongdoing is all but eliminated.167

Figure E: Rule 12(b)(6) Motions
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Motions to dismiss are far more common in antitrust class actions than in other
areas of law. Of the cases studied for this Article, 82.45% overcame at least one
motion to dismiss. Though not an identical benchmark, from 2005 to 2016, 32% of
securities filings in the Southern District of New York triggered such motions.168
Second, dismissal figures only reflect filed antitrust class actions. One cannot
confidently quantify how many cases are foregone because of forced arbitration, but
the data that is available is concerning. In 2011, Concepcion169 partially closed the
court room doors.170 In 2013, with Italian Colors,171 the Court locked them by

166. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). A court may deny such leave where
there is “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure
to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party
by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment.” Id.
167. Unfortunately, the study did not uncover any investigation by government enforcers
that followed a dismissed private enforcement action.
168. See Victor Marrero, Mission to Dismiss: A Dismissal of Rule 12(b)(6) and the
Retirement of Twombly/Iqbal, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 18 chart 1 (2018) (setting out number
of motions to dismiss and total number of securities cases).
169. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (upholding forced
arbitration provisions that preclude class aggregation).
170. See Erwin Chemerinksy, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 90 DENVER U. L. REV. 317,
317 (2012); Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and
the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 481–82 (2011)
(explaining how Concepcion “closed the door on the possibility that courts will offer
assistance to parties seeking some way to aggregate their claims in class arbitration, unless the
parties clearly and unmistakably express their intent to permit such aggregation”).
171. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
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approving arbitration provisions that banned class actions.172 Given the average time
from filing to settling,173 post-2018 data should reflect the impact of these decisions.
In 2019, the volume of antitrust settlements dropped 50%,174 and 2020 settlements
project to be on par.
Figure F: Settlements Snapshot Data 2015–2020
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This precipitous decline suggests arbitration reforms are hindering competition
oversight. Individual arbitration is a poor fit for private antitrust enforcement.
Arbitration data—let alone for antitrust arbitration—is scarce.175 Whether putative
consumers are turning to arbitration for recourse from anticompetitive wrongdoing
is unknown, but highly unlikely.176 Few consumers would learn they suffered an
antitrust injury without the benefit of extensive prefiling investigations by class
action attorneys.177 The arbitration process does little to remedy this information

172. See James Dawson, Contract after Concepcion: Some Lessons from the State Courts,
124 YALE L.J. 233, 234 (2014) (discussing how the decision limited “state courts developed
theories under which Concepcion could be cabined or read narrowly”).
173. See infra Part II.B.1 Figure J (detailing time to settlement).
174. See supra Part II.A Figure A (annual antitrust settlements).
175. See Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 62, at 18 (“[P]rior empirical scholarship on
arbitration . . . , while valuable, is also limited.”). The arbitration data that is available is
woefully thin on specifics. See id. at 9 (providing data limited to consumer, employment, and
medical malpractice arbitrations). Cf. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY
REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A) (2015), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_
arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/F88D-UD8C] (study limited
to consumer financial disputes). The study findings were akin to those noted in this Obama
administration CFPB study.
176. See Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 62, at 53 (“Concepcion did not spawn a
surge in arbitral filings.”).
177. Cf. Joel I. Klein, Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer, FINDLAW,
https://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/antitrust-enforcement-and-theconsumer.html [https://perma.cc/ED43-FYR9] (Mar. 26, 2008) (“Many consumers have never
heard of antitrust laws . . . .”).
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gap.178 Private arbitrations are often undisclosed: consumers will not learn of
wrongful misconduct alleged in arbitration complaints by other consumers.179 Unlike
Rule 23(c)(2), arbitration rules do not require notifying other injured consumers.
Even if potential plaintiffs knew they were harmed, it makes little fiscal sense for
consumers to pursue individual arbitration. Of the roughly one billion potential
claims resolved during the study,180 many involved damages too small to justify
individual action. Should a plaintiff decide to push forward nonetheless,
representation by skilled, experienced antitrust attorneys is unrealistic.181 With no
means to aggregate, lawyers are less likely to take on these small sum cases. Without
representation, the already lower odds of recovery plummet.182
These multiple challenges combined with the post-2018 decline in antitrust
settlements and filings leads to two possible conclusions. One, that droves of
irrational consumers are secretly filing individual arbitration claims. Or two,
arbitration provisions that ban class actions are curtailing private antitrust
enforcement. Occam’s razor supports the latter conclusion.

178. See Charles Gibbs, Consumer Class Actions After AT&T v. Concepcion: Why the
Federal Arbitration Act Should Not Be Used to Deny Effective Relief to Small-Value
Claimants, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1345, 1353 (2012) (“[T]he ability to alert consumers to their
injuries serves a societal goal of addressing this corporate wrong.”).
179. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, THE ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC:
MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF THEIR RIGHTS 3 (2015)
https://files.epi.org/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CLZ-36CW] (“[W]hen
there is an arbitration clause, consumers and employees are required to take their complaints
to a privatized, invisible, and often inferior forum in which they are less likely to prevail—and
if they do, they are less likely to recover their due.”).
180. The total class size for the settlements combined equals 1,047,292,493. This figure is
purposefully underreported. Several opinions did not provide a precise class size but instead
used figures like “millions” or “thousands.” For any such final approval, this calculation
presumes the absolute lowest number within the defined parameters.
181. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 179, at 22 (“[I]n addition to producing worse case
outcomes than litigation, mandatory arbitration also reduces the likelihood of obtaining the
legal representation that will help employees bring a claim in the first place.”).
182. Cf. Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 62, at 40 (“Pro se consumers were victorious
in 6% of [tort] matters, but those with one-shot law firms succeeded in 38% of awards (p <
0.001) and those with repeat-playing firms won 31% of decisions (p < 0.001).”).
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For filed cases, the annual number of motions to compel arbitration is small. Any
conclusions drawn from them are provisional. Yet the grant rate for even this small
pool is growing. Until 2012, the total grant rate was 29%. From 2013 on, the grant
rate nearly doubled at 53%.
Figure G: Grant Rate Motions to Compel Arbitration
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Third, even for cases not subject to arbitration, judicial reinterpretation of class
certification requirements is limiting enforcement. Across all circuits and over the
entire studied period, class certification grant rates held steady. Yet, the image looks
very different by circuit. While many courts read new requirements into Rule 23,183
two of the highest volume circuits are holding back. The Ninth Circuit rebuffs more
arduous interpretations of manageability,184 while the Second Circuit rejects harsher
ascertainability requirements.185 Additionally, the Third Circuit, where the
ascertainability requirement originated, has since loosened the requisite showing.186
The largest number of class certifications occurred in these three circuits.
Plaintiffs have limited control over the venue of a class action. The Judicial Panel
for Multidistrict Litigation consolidates pending putative class actions and assigns

183. See supra Part I.A.3 (detailing new predominance and manageability requirements).
184. See, e.g., Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting
manageability argument based on proportionality of recovery); Six (6) Mexican Workers v.
Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting manageability
challenges, given “enforcement, deterrence or disgorgement” functions of the pending class
claim).
185. See, e.g., In re Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 268 (2d Cir. 2017) (“We conclude that
an implied administrative feasibility requirement would be inconsistent with the careful
balance struck in Rule 23, which directs courts to weigh the competing interests inherent in
any class certification decision.” (citation omitted)).
186. See, e.g., City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am. Inc., 867 F.3d 434,
441 (3d Cir. 2017) (making off more rigid ascertainability standards by acknowledging “Rule
23 does not require an objective way of determining class membership at the certification
stage”).
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them to a transferee court.187 If a case is not assigned to the Second, Third, or Ninth
Circuit, the odds of class certification drop from 49.4% to 37.5%.
Figure H: Grant Rates Motion to Certify Class by Circuit
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Individually, procedural reforms have hobbled private enforcement. Collectively,
their damage exceeds the sum of their parts. These reforms have altered the
maturation of antitrust class actions. An endless barrage of dispositive motions is the
new norm, from motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and motions to
exclude expert testimony.
Despite oft-repeated claims to the contrary, the threat of class certification is not
pivotal.188 It is but one motion among many. For example, In re Polyurethane Foam
Antitrust only settled after twenty-six motions to dismiss, seventeen motions for
summary judgment, one motion for class certification, and six motions for
reconsideration.189 For In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust, the numbers were
higher: forty motions to dismiss, thirty-three motions for summary judgment, and
three motions for class certification.190 But perhaps the most astounding is an earlier

187. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (requiring related federal civil cases to be transferred to one judge
for consolidated pretrial proceedings); see also Danielle Oakley, Is Multidistrict Litigation a
Just and Efficient Consolidation Technique? Using Diet Drug Litigation as a Model to Answer
This Question, 6 NEV. L.J. 494, 496–501 (2005) (detailing the multidistrict litigation
consolidation process).
188. See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008),
amended (Jan. 16, 2009) (describing “the pivotal status of class certification in large-scale
litigation”); Barry Sullivan & Amy Kobelski Trueblood, Rule 23(f): A Note on Law and
Discretion in the Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277, 278 (2008) (“Arguably, the most critical
stage in a class action is the point at which the court decides whether to certify the class.”).
189. See Docket: In re Polyurethane Form Antitrust Litig., JUSTIA,
https://dockets.justia.com/docket/ohio/ohndce/1:2010md02196/170855
[https://perma.cc/4NMV-8Q6A] (N.D. Ohio, No 1:10-md-02196).
190. See Docket: In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., JUSTIA,
https://dockets.justia.com/docket/california/candce/4:2007cv05944/197984
[https://perma.cc/J78Z-FASL] (N.D. Cal., No. 4:07-cv-05944).
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example. In In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation, before settling,
plaintiffs first had to overcome ninety-seven motions to dismiss (an average of over
four motions per defendant).191 This was in addition to eleven motions for summary
judgment, along with multiple motions to certify and decertify the class, challenges
to expert testimony, and appeals.192
These examples represent the outer limits of extreme motion practice. But the
number of key procedural motions filed in each settled case during the studied period
increased.193 Sixty-nine percent of the settlements occurred after at least one motion
to dismiss; 33% faced at least one motion for summary judgment.
Figure I: Phase of Proceeding at Settlement
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More procedural gatekeeping comes at a cost—literally. Comparing antitrust class
actions to data from all federal civil cases is telling. After three years of litigation,
only 12.57% of federal civil cases are still pending.194 Of the studied antitrust cases,
77.35% were still going strong at the three-year mark. A conservative measurement
of the median time from filing to settlement was 4.41 years or 52.93 months195—
44.16 months longer than the median across all federal civil actions.196 For antitrust

191. See Docket, In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., GOVINFO.GOV,
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-md-01827/USCOURTS-cand3_07-md-01827-818/context [https://perma.cc/9XWL-QLAE] (N.D. Cal., No. 1827).
192. See id.
193. This data was gathered from a manual review of each settling cases’ docket.
194. See Caseload Statistics, supra note 158 (Data culled from Table N/A for the U.S.
District Courts–Combined Civil and Criminal Federal Court Management Statistics, During
the 12-Month Periods Ending September 31, from 2005–2019).
195. This figure does not reflect prefiling investigations by class counsel. Prefiling
investigation periods can be extensive because lengthy complaints are now common. See, e.g.,
Abrams v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., No. 4:16-CV-1343, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209905, at
*22 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2017) (referencing 230, 183, 151, and 131 page complaints).
196. The median time from filing to disposition for federal cases from 2005–2009 was 0.73
years, or 8.77 months. See Caseload Statistics, supra note 158.
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class actions over $100 million (almost 20% of all the final approval settlements),
that figure increased to 5.71 years.
Table 3: Time from Filing to Settlement

Settlement Size

Final Approvals

Average Months

Median Months

393

59.3

52.9

331

57.5

51.3

62

68.8

60.6

All
Settlements

Less than
$100M
Over $100M

Procedural reforms have failed to reap their intended efficiency gains. Instead,
antitrust class actions take longer than ever. The idea of “frivolous” or meritless suits
being brought in such circumstances is no more than a myth.197 If supposed in
terrorem cases clear such high procedural hurdles, they cannot be fairly considered
frivolous. The time from filing to settling is growing at a rate of 8.6% annually. If
recent trends continue, such cases should trigger an increase of roughly four months
of additional litigation each year.
Figure J: Average Months To Settle
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197. Brief of the Am. Antitrust Inst. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 34,
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (No. 12-133), 2013 WL 417719,
at *34; see also Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs
Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 159 (2006)
(debunking the myth of meritless claims).
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Rather than restraining the growing expense of private enforcement efforts,
reforms are contributing to rising costs.198 Additional motion practice has pushed the
average cost per settlement to increase 13% annually.199

$4

Figure K: Average Cost per Final Approval Settlement
(adjusted for inflation)
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All told, the last decade of reforms has pushed courts away from the guiding
principle of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In antitrust class actions, the
judiciary is no longer interpreting procedural rules with an eye for “the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”200 Instead, plaintiffs
bring fewer antitrust cases to the judiciary. The judiciary no longer makes a
determination in every case—arbitration forecloses litigation. For cases courts do
hear, what is “just” depends less on merits than the court to which it is assigned. For
those fortunate cases that succeed, that feat is neither speedy nor inexpensive.
2. Chilling Effects
The last fifteen years of reform have done more than impact time and expense;
they have limited the reach of antitrust class actions. Congress designed antitrust
laws, including the Sherman Act, to remedy a broad range of anticompetitive
misconduct.201 Comprehensive regulatory oversight requires enforcing both sections

198. This is not to say procedural reforms are the only reason for increased costs. Cf. Craig
C. Corbitt, Judith A. Zahid & Patrick B. Clayton, Pre-Complaint Activities, in PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: A HANDBOOK 43, § 2.05 (Albert A.
Foer & Randy M. Stutz eds., 2012) (“The global scope of contemporary cartels also increases
the cost of litigation.”).
199. This figure reflects the average of the annual percent change.
200. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
201. See Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Econ. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Just. Competition Policy in Distressed Industries, Remarks at the ABA Antitrust Symposium:
Competition as Public Policy (May 13, 2009) (“[A]ntitrust law is sufficiently flexible to permit
a wide range of business practices and creative business models . . . .”); A.E. Rodriguez &
Ashok Menon, The Causes of Competition Agency Ineffectiveness in Developing Countries,
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1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. In response to the changing procedural landscape,
private enforcement has focused on regulating cartels—while foregoing oversight of
other wrongdoing. Ninety-three percent of the final approval decisions involved
alleged section 1 claims.202 Only slightly over 19% of the decisions included section
2 monopoly allegations. These cases reached a sliver of potential case theories,
specifically horizontal price fixing and market manipulations to supply or output.
Table 4: Recovery & Settlements by Case Theory
Case Theory

% of Total
Recovery

% of
Settlements

Price Fixing

81.9%

70.6%

Market Manipulation

11.1%

13.7%

Bid Rigging

7.5%

14.9%

Market Allocation

7.3%

12.4%

Group Boycott
Abuse of Monopoly
Power
Bundling/Tying

6.2%

2.8%

2.5%

5.7%

2.3%

5.0%

Generic Cartel Activity

1.9%

2.6%

Exclusive Dealing

1.1%

2.9%

Merger

0.1%

0.3%

For class counsel with finite litigation resources, price fixing and market
manipulation claims are safer investments. Such cases are not easy—not by a long
shot—but they are less difficult to prove than their antitrust brethren. Such cases
require evidence of a conspiracy.203 Few defendants are forthcoming about illegal
price-fixing agreements, and evidence of such deals is difficult to fully gather in
advance of discovery.204 But once a conspiracy is established, defendants are per se

79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 39 (2016) (describing how antitrust covers a “wide range of
business practices of business practices ranging from vertical practices, abuse of dominant
positions, commonplace horizontal practices, to full-fledged merger reviews”).
202. See infra Table 5.
203. See, e.g., United States v. Coop. Theatres of Ohio, Inc., 845 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir.
1988) (applying per se review to customer allocation agreements regardless of whether the
defendant knew the probable anticompetitive effects of its agreement); United States v. Gillen,
599 F.2d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Thus in price-fixing conspiracies, where the conduct is
illegal per se, no inquiry has to be made on the issue of intent beyond proof that one joined or
formed the conspiracy.”).
204. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 50, at 58. As one scholar explains, “Based on
differences among judges, one judge may dismiss a complaint while another concludes that it
survives, solely because of the way each judge applies his or her ‘judicial experience and
common sense.’ This is bound to create unpredictability, lack of uniformity, and confusion.”
Malveaux, supra note 50, at 624.
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liable.205 Courts usually presume market power, thus the remaining battles focus on
quantifying damages.206
Even for price fixing and market manipulation claims, indirect purchaser antitrust
class actions are not faring well. This raises red flags for underenforcement. Such
cases are filed as a regular counterpart to direct purchaser cases,207 but few survive
long enough to settle. While cost-per-settlement ratios for indirect purchasers are on
par with direct suits,208 settlement amounts trend lower, as do fee awards. Direct
purchaser settlements now outpace indirect purchaser settlements almost four-toone.
Reforms increase the risk of an indirect purchaser case getting ensnared in
procedural hurdles. Indirect purchaser complaints require more detailed allegations
of harm, beyond alleging a conspiracy. Indirect purchasers also must allege that the
defendants’ wrongdoing harmed the direct purchasers. From there, they need
plausible allegations that these direct purchasers passed on some of this
supracompetitive pricing.209 Post Twiqbal, a court can dismiss a complaint that fails
to sufficiently and plausibly allege either of these tracing requirements.210 Those
complaints that survive must then satisfy the more rigorous certification
requirements now at play.211 For multistate cases, these standards can be

205. See, e.g., In re High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2002)
(“Because price fixing is a per se violation of the Sherman Act, an admission by the defendants
that they agreed to fix their prices is all the proof a plaintiff needs.”).
206. See In re Cox Enters., Inc., 871 F.3d 1093, 1097 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Under a per se
rule, plaintiffs prevail simply by proving that a particular contract or business
arrangement . . . exists; no further market analysis is necessary, and defendants may not
present any defenses.” (citation omitted)); In re N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 152 F.T.C. 640,
655 (2011) (“A court need not then inquire whether the restraint’s authors actually possess the
power to inflict public injury . . . , nor will the court accept argument that the restraint in the
circumstances is justified by any procompetitive purpose or effect.” (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1362 (5th Cir. 1980))).
207. See, e.g., In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1015
(N.D. Cal. 2010); In re Flash Memory Antitrust Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1140 (N.D. Cal.
2009); In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1013 (N.D. Cal.
2007).
208. Cost-per-settlement ratio reflects the cost as a percentage of the total settlement.
Direct purchaser settlements were 2.02%. Indirect purchasers were 2.6%.
209. See, e.g., In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2420 YGR, 2014
WL 4955377, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2014) (“[Indirect purchasers] allegedly paid the
overcharge because it was ‘passed on to them by direct purchaser manufacturers, distributors
and retailers.’” (citation omitted)); In re Pool Prod. Distrib. Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 946 F. Supp.
2d 554, 568 (E.D. La. 2013) (denying motion to dismiss because indirect purchasers
sufficiently “alleged a distinct injury in the amount of an overcharge that was passed on to
IPPs as a result of defendants’ anticompetitive conduct”).
210. See, e.g., In re Cast Iron Soil Pipe & Fittings Antitrust Litig., No. 1:14-MD-2508,
2015 WL 5166014, at *22 (E.D. Tenn. June 24, 2015); In re Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., No.
2031, 2014 WL 553332, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2014); In re Photochromic Lens Antitrust
Litig., No. 8:10-CV-1158-T-27EAJ, 2011 WL 13141933, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2011); In
re Ditropan XL Antitrust Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
211. See supra Part I.A (detailing choice of law challenges for indirect purchaser cases).
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insurmountable.212 On average, direct purchaser claims face 7.7 motions per case.
Once an indirect purchaser claim is added, that number jumps to 20.13 motions per
case.
As for claims other than price fixing and market manipulation, private
enforcement is dwindling. There is little effective antitrust enforcement for bundling
or retail price maintenance. Most vertical section 1 claims accompanied horizontal
claims. Only 1.4% of settlements involved solely vertical section 1 claims.

I

Table 5: Settlements by Sherman Act Section & Restraint Type

I

I Sherman Act Section I Restraint Type I Settlements I Percentage I
1

Horizontal
Vertical
Both H & V

1&2

I

Total

II

84.9%

156

11.7%

45

3.4%

1,046
18
63

Horizontal
Vertical
Both H & V

2

1,127

125
25
6

I

1,328

78.8%
1.4%
4.7%
9.4%
1.9%
0.5%

I 100.0%

I

Vertical restraint cases under sections 1 and 2 are incompatible with the rigorous
procedural hurdles now common in class actions. Courts apply the “rule of reason”
to such claims.213 To be liable, a defendant must have enough economic power that
its alleged misconduct could impact a particular market.214 A plaintiff must make an
initial showing of the defendant’s market power or show actual detrimental effect
caused by the defendant. Then, after this initial showing, the controlling question is
whether these anticompetitive effects are sufficiently justified by countervailing
procompetitive justifications.215

212. See, e.g., In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Antitrust Litig., 299 F.R.D. 555, 588 (E.D.
Tenn. 2014) (denying class certification to multistate indirect purchaser claim because “[t]he
antitrust laws of many states differ markedly”); In re Processed Egg Prod. Antitrust Litig., 312
F.R.D. 124, 165 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (“Because of the significant variability in the state laws
Plaintiffs seek to apply, a more detailed plan for managing this proposed ‘all-in-one’ litigation
would be necessary to meet the burden of showing this proposed class action is manageable.”
(citation omitted)).
213. See, e.g., Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc)
(vertical section 1 claims); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977)
(vertical section 1 claims); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) (section
2 claims).
214. See, e.g., King Drug Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 412 (3d Cir.
2015) (“If a plaintiff meets his initial burden of adducing adequate evidence of market power
or actual anti-competitive effects, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the
challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive objective . . . .”).
215. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889 (2007).
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Historically, courts were reluctant to reject proposed relevant market definitions
at the pleading stage.216 Post Twiqbal, that reluctance is gone. Federal courts across
the nation are dismissing complaints for failing to allege a “plausible” market
definition.217 Gathering nuanced economic information without the benefit of
discovery can require herculean, fact specific prefiling investigation.218 Complaints
now must address why a given market lacks barriers to entry, what substitutes exist
for the particular product at issue, and other “pertinent facts relating to crosselasticity of demand.”219
Procedural hurdles disincentivize pursuing rule of reason cases, except for
wrongdoing in cases involving relatively straightforward product markets. And the
data clearly confirms this: rule of reason cases made up only 10.94% of the studied
settlements.220 Of these, the vast majority related to pharmaceuticals. Over 85% of

216. See NIBCO Inc. v. Viega LLC, 354 F. Supp. 3d 566, 576 (M.D. Pa. 2018).
217. See Madison 92nd St. Assocs., LLC v. Courtyard Mgmt. Corp., 624 F. App’x 23, 28–
29 (2d Cir. 2015) (dismissing complaint for failing to address interchangeability and crosselasticity); PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. CV 2:03 CV 107, 2009
WL 938561, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2009) (“The Fifth Circuit requires plaintiffs to define
their market with reference to the rule of reasonable interchangeability.” (citation omitted)),
aff’d, 615 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2010); Total Renal Care, Inc. v. W. Nephrology & Metabolic
Bone Disease, P.C., No. 08-cv-00513, 2009 WL 2596493, at *17 (D. Colo. Aug. 21, 2009)
(same); see also Semertzides v. Bethesda N. Hosp., No. 1:14–CV–135, 2014 WL 2573073, at
*5 (S.D. Ohio June 9, 2014), aff’d, 608 F. App’x 378 (6th Cir. 2015); Int’l Equip. Trading,
Ltd. v. Illumina, Inc., No. 17 C 5010, 2018 WL 3861575, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2018);
Ferguson Med. Grp., L.P. v. Mo. Delta Med. Ctr., No. 1:06CV8, 2006 WL 2225454, at *3
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2006) (“[C]ourts have not hesitated to dismiss antitrust claims where it is
clear that the alleged relevant market is too narrow, implausible, . . . or simply not defined
anywhere in the pleadings.” (citation omitted)); Kassner v. Kadlec Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. CV–
11–5114, 2012 WL 523675, at *6 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 15, 2012) (“Dismissal is proper if an
antitrust complaint’s market definition is facially unsustainable.” (citation omitted)); GlynnBrunswick Hosp. Auth. v. Becton, 159 F. Supp. 3d 1361, 1379 (S.D. Ga. 2016).
218. In addition to providing specifics about anticompetitive conduct, section 2 complaints
must allege the defendant possessed monopoly power in the relevant product and geographic
market. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966); PepsiCo, Inc.
v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002). The complaint must distinguish
substitutes reasonably available to buyers. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392–93 (1956); Affinity LLC v. GfK Mediamark Rsch. & Intel., LLC, No.
12 CIV. 1728, 2013 WL 1189317, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2013), aff’d, 547 F. App’x 54 (2d
Cir. 2013).
219. Yellow Page Sols., Inc. v. Bell Atl. Yellow Pages Co., No. 00 Civ. 5563, 2001 WL
1468168, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2001).
220. See, e.g., In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1319
n.40 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (deeming a relevant market to be composed of branded and generic
terazosin hydrochloride); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 680–81
(E.D. Mich. 2000) (defining relevant market as the branded and generic versions of a heart
medication with the chemical compound diltiazem hydrochloride), aff’d, 332 F.3d 896 (6th
Cir. 2003).
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the section 2 cases involved allegations of delaying generic entry for a patented drug.
The market in such cases is straightforward and less debated.221
The narrowed scope of modern antitrust class actions warrants concern that
decades of procedural reform have chilled private enforcement. Per se direct
purchaser cases for market manipulation and price fixing continue, while indirect
purchaser or rule of reason claims wane.222 As the next Part discusses, the future of
even this more limited regulatory oversight is at risk. The settlement data identifies
additional efforts on the horizon to further restrict class actions.
III. READING OBJECTORS’ TEA LEAVES
As Part II detailed, procedural reforms are driving suboptimal antitrust
enforcement, from places where reform may not be expected.223 To some, reforms
still have not gone far enough. As discussed in Part I, class members can object to
settlement or fee approval requests.224 This Part spotlights efforts by professional
objectors to further curtail antitrust class actions.
Over the last fifteen years, objectors contested roughly 40% of antitrust
settlements.225 Once one objector filed, others quickly piled on.226 Courts only
granted 2.6% of these objections, overruling the rest mostly for lack of standing or
merit.227 Despite judicial228 and legislative229 efforts to limit baseless objections,
antitrust objections are on the rise.

221. See, e.g., In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1319 n.40
(deeming a relevant market to be composed of branded and generic terazosin hydrochloride);
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 680–81 (defining relevant market as
the branded and generic versions of a heart medication with the chemical compound diltiazem
hydrochloride).
222. Cf. Corbitt et. al, supra note 198 at § 2.04 (“Even a seemingly strong case on the
merits may be uneconomical to pursue, at least on a contingent fee basis, because the damages
are not high enough, the anticipated expenses for discovery and experts are too high, or the
case is otherwise too risky to pursue.”).
223. See infra Part I.B.
224. See id.
225. Of the 393 final approvals studied, 151 had at least one objection, exactly 38.42%.
See infra Table 6.
226. See, e.g., Smith v. Tower Loan of Miss., Inc., 216 F.R.D. 338, 350 (S.D. Miss. 2003)
(discussing how objections “largely parrot one another”), aff’d sub nom. Smith v. Crystian, 91
F. App’x 952 (5th Cir. 2004); Defendants’ Joint Memorandum in Opposition to Class
Settlement at 8, In re Nat’l Arb. F. Trade Pracs. Litig., No. 01-md-02122 (D. Minn. July 21,
2011) (describing objections as “virtually identical form letter objections”).
227. Of these objections, 74.26% were made by individuals who lacked standing or raised
meritless challenges.
228. See Robert Klonoff, Class Action Objectors: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 89
FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 493–99 (2020) (detailing judicial efforts to curb “bad” objectors,
including appeal bonds, disgorgement, and sanctions).
229. Congress amended Rule 23 in 2003 and 2018 to respond to the objector problem.
Originally, judicial approval was only required for payments accompanying withdrawn
objections. Some objectors, though, would threaten, but not actually file, an objection unless
compensated. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 97, § 13:34. These new amendments require more

367408-ILJ 97-4_Text.indd 274

6/15/22 1:00 PM

2022]

1357

ANTITRUST CLASS ACTIONS

2020*

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2006

2005

2007

Figure L: Antitrust Settlement Objections

20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

*Projected from 3/31/2020 – 12/31/2020
This de minimis success rate might suggest serial objectors are more a nuisance
than a serious threat. But even meritless objections prolong antitrust class actions,
drive up costs, and sometimes force counsel to pay off objectors to prevent delay.230
Quisquous professional objectors also pose a different insidious threat, heretofore
underexamined in legal scholarship. These objectors have played a larger role in the
development of reform than perhaps thought before. They use settlement challenges
to push for procedural reforms, circumventing the legislative process. There is a
striking link between failed objections and procedural reforms by the legislature or
the judiciary. CAFA enacted proposals that courts previously rejected when raised

specific objections and judicial approval for payments to objectors. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5)(B).
230. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 90, § 21.643; Brunet,
supra note 105, at 429 (discussing how objections “increas[e] the transaction costs of class
action litigation”). As the Honorable Denise Cote of Southern District of New York explains:
Repeat objectors to class action settlements can make a living simply by filing
frivolous appeals and thereby slowing down the execution of settlements. The
larger the settlement, the more cost-effective it is to pay the objectors rather
than suffer the delay of waiting for an appeal to be resolved (even an expedited
appeal). Because of these economic realities, professional objectors can levy
what is effectively a tax on class action settlements, a tax that has no benefit
to anyone other than to the objectors. Literally nothing is gained from the cost:
Settlements are not restructured and the class, on whose behalf the appeal is
purportedly raised, gains nothing.
In re Gen. Elec. Co. Sec. Litig., 998 F. Supp. 2d 145, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); cf. O’Keefe v.
Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC, 214 F.R.D. 266, 295 n.26 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“Federal courts are
increasingly weary of professional objectors: ‘some of the objections were obviously canned
objections filed by professional objectors who seek out class actions to simply extract a fee by
lodging generic, unhelpful protests.’” (citations omitted)).
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as settlement objections.231 Professional objectors are also driving the spread of the
narrower interpretations of Rule 23 detailed in Part I.232
Given the relationship between objections and reforms, a tasseography of
settlement challenges may foretell the next attacks on private antitrust
enforcement.233 This Part examines two objector-led reforms. Professional objectors
want to limit nonmonetary settlements and reduce fee awards—endangering already
weakened private antitrust enforcement efforts.
A. The Push for Cash Only
Professional objectors seek to redefine a “reasonable” antitrust settlement. Out of
all antitrust settlements studied, 94.7% provided at least some cash component.234
But for objectors, this is insufficient. Objectors typically insist a settlement is only
reasonable if the entire fund is paid out to class members in cash.235 While injunctive
relief often fired up objectors,236 they reserved considerable ire for antitrust
settlement distributions in any mode other than a bank check.
Settlements with nonmonetary components are prevalent, as they respond to the
unique challenges of aggregate litigation. The costs of administrating settlement

231. See, e.g., Henry v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 98-CV-4110, 1999 WL 33496080, at
*5 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 1999) (discussing unsuccessful objections to coupon settlements preCAFA); In re Mex. Money Transfer Litig. (W. Union & Valuta), 164 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1027–
28 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (same), aff’d sub nom. In re Mex. Money Transfer Litig., 267 F.3d 743
(7th Cir. 2001).
232. See, e.g., In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., No.
05-MD-1720, 2019 WL 6875472, at *30 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2019) (rejecting objectors
ascertainability challenge); In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litig., No. 13-md-02420,
2020 WL 7264559, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2020) (rejecting settlement challenge asserting
choice of law issues precluded certification).
233. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 90, § 21.643 (warning
“even a weak objection may have more influence than its merits justify”).
234. Objectors seem to concentrate a great deal of energy on injunctive and nonmonetary
settlements as opposed to lower dollar amount settlements. Forty-five percent of nonmonetary
and injunctive final approvals were objected to. Of monetary settlements less than $25 million,
24% were objected to. Monetary settlements over $25 million were objected to in 55% of
cases.
235. See, e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 282 F.R.D. 92, 117 (D.N.J. 2012)
(objecting to cy pres distribution even though “many of the Settlement Class members who
will be receiving the cy pres award may have already received payments from these other three
settlements” (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)); In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust
Litig., 168 F. Supp. 3d 985, 1005 (N.D. Ohio 2016) (rejecting professional objector’s assertion
that “no settlement money may be paid to cy pres [sic] until every class member who has filed
a claim has received 100% of alleged damages, which in this case would include treble and
punitive damages” (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)).
236. See, e.g., Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 291 (3d Cir. 2011) (challenging
injunctive relief); In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. C
06-4333, 2013 WL 12333442, at *42 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2013); Objection to Proposed
Settlement & Fee Request, In re Am. Express Anti Steering Rules Antitrust Litig. (II), 1:11md-02221 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2014).
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distributions can exceed individual settlement amounts.237 Even when settlements
provide cash payouts, funds can remain. Many class members are unable or unwilling
to satisfy claim requirements.238 Some members never learn of the settlement.239
Mailed settlement checks can be returned or never cashed.240 In such circumstances,
nonmonetary settlements provide class members an alternate benefit. Products or gift
cards are common direct alternatives.241 Indirect alternatives include cy pres—that
is, charitable distributions of leftover settlement funds—and charitable
settlements,242 where cy pres is in lieu of a distribution to class members.243
Professional objectors do not see these alternatives as pragmatic solutions. Selfproclaimed protectants, they are saving class members from “abusive” settlements
and a legal system ripe with corruption.244 To their jaundice eyes, creative settlement
distributions are indicia of the rampant corruption inherent in class actions245—

237. See, e.g., In re Easysaver Rewards Litig., 906 F.3d 747, 761 (9th Cir. 2018); In re Ins.
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 282 F.R.D. 92, 117 (D.N.J. 2012).
238. See, e.g., SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); In
re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 557 F. Supp. 1091, 1104 (N.D. Ill. 1983); MARCY HOGAN
GREER, A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO CLASS ACTIONS 37 (Supp. 2012).
239. See, e.g., Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th
Cir. 1990) (“[A] substantial number of class members would never be located for distribution
of the damage award.”).
240. See, e.g., All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 330 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting
many settlement checks “were returned as undeliverable or were never cashed”); Powell v.
Ga.-Pac. Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 707 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[O]ver 125 checks were returned as
undeliverable.” (citation omitted)).
241. See, e.g., Lisa M. Mezzetti & Whitney R. Case, The Coupon Can Be the Ticket: The
Use of “Coupon” and Other Non-Monetary Redress in Class Action Settlements, 18 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1431, 1433 n.11 (2005) (listing forms of non-cash settlement relief).
242. See, e.g., Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 475 (5th Cir. 2011) (“A
cy pres distribution puts settlement funds to their next-best use by providing an indirect benefit
to the class.”); Michael J. Slobom, Recalibrating Cy Pres Settlements to Restore the
Equilibrium, 123 DICK. L. REV. 281, 302 (2018) (“The cy pres doctrine provided a mechanism
to dispose of non-distributable settlement funds while preserving an indirect benefit to injured
parties and disincentivizing misconduct.” (footnotes omitted)); accord Jay Tidmarsh, Cy Pres
and the Optimal Class Action, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 767, 768 (2014) (discussing options for
settlement distributions).
243.
See Christine P. Bartholomew, Saving Charitable Settlements, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
3241, 3248 (2015) (discussing cy pres and charitable distributions).
244. See, e.g., Casey, supra note 30; see also 141 CONG. REC. S9173 (daily ed. June 27,
1995) (statement of Sen. Barbara Mikulski); Mike France, Don’t Kill All the Trial Lawyers,
BUSINESSWEEK
(Aug.
25,
2002,
12:00
AM),
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2002-08-25/23-dont-kill-all-the-trial-lawyers
[https://perma.cc/HM57-CL9X] (arguing against negative perceptions of plaintiffs’
attorneys).
245. See, e.g., Objection of Amy Yang, In re Transpacific Air Transp. Antitrust Litig.,
3:07-cv-05634 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2015) (presuming “the danger of conflicts of interest [is]
endemic to class actions”); Objections of Conner Erwin, In re Optical Disk Drive Prods.
Antitrust Litig., 3:10-md-2143 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2016) (contending, with no evidence, that
“[t]here is also a very real concern that Class Counsel will double-dip [in seeking fees] as new
settlements are achieved”).
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despite no evidence of collusion or self-dealing in the 1328 antitrust settlements
studied. Professional objectors view class counsel, defense counsel, and the district
court judge as pushing settlements,246 so much so that they believe class counsel sell
out the class by agreeing to noncash terms,247 and then the overseeing judge either
lacks the knowledge or incentive to interfere.248
This cynicism drives settlement challenges249: one in five objections related to cy
pres provisions.

246. See, e.g., Erin L. Sheley & Theodore H. Frank, Prospective Injunctive Relief and
Class Settlements, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 774 (2016) (noting that the parties lack
the “incentive to achieve—and courts have no institutional competence to evaluate—the
public deterrence benefits that purportedly justify the absence of compensation”).
247. See Objections. of Class Members Ira Conner Erwin, Luis Mario Santana, and Stefan
Rest to Settlement & Attorney-Fee Request, In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 3:07md-1827 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2012) (contending class counsel intentionally filed a losing case
or “a lawsuit they believe[d] they are more likely to win than lose, but chose to cash out for a
fraction of the recovery”); Objector Leslie Yagar’s Brief in Support of Objection at 6, In re
Reformulated Gasoline (RFG) Antitrust & Pat. Litig., 2:05-ml-0167-CAS-VBK (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 24, 2008) (arguing that because the settlement provides “no distribution to Class
Members and there is no injunctive relief . . . [, the requested fee award is a] significant
windfall for Class Counsel”).
248. Statement before the H. Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. on the Const. & Civ. Just.
Examination of Litig. Abuse, 113th Cong. (2013) (Statement of Theodore H. Frank, Adjunct
Fellow, Manhattan Institute Center for Legal Policy, President, Center for Class Action
Fairness) (“[T]o the extent class attorneys exploit that conflict of interest, judges lack the
necessary information or incentive to rectify self-dealing in most cases.”) [hereinafter “Frank
House Statement”]; cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 714 n.121 (1986) (“[I]t is doubtful that courts
have much incentive to be very demanding [in reviewing settlements].”). Judges are taking
their oversight responsibility seriously, subjecting nondirect payment settlements to exacting
scrutiny and playing an active part in modifying the settlement terms. See, e.g., In re Currency
Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 263 F.R.D. 110, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (anticipating notice
issues and requiring amended notice before final approval hearing), aff’d sub nom.
Priceline.com, Inc. v. Silberman, 405 F. App’x 532 (2d Cir. 2010); Order & Final Judgement
at 2, In re Publ’n Paper Antitrust Litig., 3:04-md-01631 (D. Conn. Apr. 28, 2008). Judges
rarely relied on objectors to flag issues. See, e.g., Order & Final Judgement as to Remax Int’l
at 2, Hyland v. Homeservices, Inc., 3:05-cv-00612 (W.D. Ky. May 3, 2012), ECF No. 645
(denying preliminary approval without an objector raising concerns).
249. Challenges are laden with this contempt. Objectors characterize cy pres as a means
“to permit judges to play Santa Claus with settlement money.” Brief of Objector-Appellant
Darren McKinney at *17, Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, No. 10-55129, 2010 WL 5779667 (9th Cir.
July 20, 2010). Meanwhile, defendants enjoy “a negotiated windfall” while affording class
counsel the opportunity to seek “grossly excessive” fee requests. Response to Indirect
Purchaser Plaintiffs’ and Attorneys General’s Joint Motions for Final Approval of Settlements,
Plans of Distribution, and for Attorneys Fees at 18–19, In re Dynamic Random Access
Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. 4:02-md-01486 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2014).
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Objection Type
Fees, Costs & Incentive
Awards

I

Final
Approvals

I

% of Total
Recovery

I

% of Total
Costs

I
I

% of Final
Approvals

68.9%

57.6%

39.0%

26.5%

Amount & Scope of Release

49.0%

50.7%

32.8%

18.8%

Notice
Certification & Class
Definition
Claims Process
Allocation
Cy Pres
Discovery, Insufficient
Investigation & Unsealing
No Wrongdoing & No
Admission of Wrongdoing
Other & Unknown

44.4%

39.5%

25.5%

17.0%

32.5%

37.8%

24.2%

12.5%

28.5%
26.5%
19.2%

35.3%
31.3%
11.5%

21.0%
19.3%
9.6%

10.9%
10.2%
7.4%

16.6%

13.4%

8.1%

6.4%

9.9%

4.4%

2.6%

3.8%

51.7%

23.4%

23.8%

19.8%

I

All Objections

II

100.0%

I

72.5%

I

51.6%

I

38.4%

I

I

Tort reform groups, particularly the Center for Class Action Fairness (CCAF) and
affiliated entities,250 actively challenge noncash settlements.251 They malign cy pres
settlements as “gimmicks” that allow “class counsel . . . [to] sacrifice millions of
dollars [otherwise available] . . . in more straightforward settlements.”252 Thirty-three
percent of their challenges centered on cy pres.

250. CCAF strives to distance itself from other professional objectors, claiming it does not
seek payment for its objections. But see Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: CCAF Motion
for Fees at 2–3, In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 1:10-md-2196 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 14,
2016) (rejecting CCAF’s contention that it was “entitled to least $435,600” or an average
hourly rate of $2,755); Alison Frankel, Exposing Class Action Objectors: Lieff Cabaraser,
Ted Frank in ‘Lurid’ Dispute, REUTERS (June 22, 2015, 4:16 PM)
https://www.reuters.com/article/idUS14021648020150622 [https://perma.cc/66FY-2XM5]
(detailing Frank’s financial relationships with other professional objectors); EMILY GOTTLIEB
& JOANNE DOROSHOW, TOP 30 TORT REFORM HYPOCRITES OF 2018! (2018),
http://centerjd.org/system/files/Hypocrites2018F2.pdf.
251. In 2013, the founder of CCAF, Theodore Frank, acted on his own to urge the House
Judiciary Committee to preclude cy pres settlements. See Frank House Statement, supra note
248. CCAF has mirrored this push via the judiciary. See, e.g., In re Polyurethane Foam
Antitrust Litig., 178 F. Supp. 3d 621, 622 (N.D. Ohio 2016); Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d
1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2011); In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Exp. Antitrust Litig., 842 F. Supp.
2d 346, 351 (D. Me. 2012); In re Classmates.com Consol. Litig., No. C09-45RAJ, 2012 WL
3854501, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 15, 2012).
252. Brief for Petitioners, Frank v. Gaos, 139 S.Ct. 1041 (2019) (No. 17-961), 2018 WL
3374998, at *16–17.
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In seeking to limit settlement options, professional objectors myopically focus on
compensation, ignoring all other benefits of antitrust class actions.253 Private antitrust
suits have more deterrent potential than government enforcement.254 Such suits are
also fundamental to ensuring judicial access to victims, who lack the incentives or
ability to otherwise vindicate their rights.255 But to professional objectors, deterrence
and judicial access—gains not dependent on cash outs256—be damned.
Nor does it matter that a broad definition of adequate settlements preserves
flexibility, consumer choice, and effectiveness in class actions. In fact, professional
objectors would rather risk foregoing any settlement than agree to a noncash benefit.
Consider In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litigation,257 which involved an alleged
anticompetitive market division between Walmart and Netflix regarding DVD
rentals.258 Walmart agreed to settle for $27,250,000.259 Class members could select
a gift card or check.260 A fully cash payout settlement was improbable because
postage costs “threatened to materially erode the amount of per capita payments to
Claimants.”261 A larger settlement was unrealistic since the case was heading south,
fast.262 The district court approved the settlement, overruling professional objectors’
challenges to the gift card option, a choice 63% of the class eventually selected.263
Objectors, nonetheless, appealed to the Ninth Circuit, insisting they represented the

253. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 816
(1997) (“More critical than the limited compensatory relief now offered in these low-value
class actions is the prospect that the law would be unable to deter future misconduct absent an
effective policing mechanism.”).
254. John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime
Pays, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 427, 476–79 (2012).
255. Pastor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 487 F.3d 1042, 1047 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The
policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small
recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting
his or her rights.” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997));
Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled with Section 7 Rights?, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 173, 216 (2003) (“One of the objectives of class actions is to afford judicial
access to plaintiffs . . . .”).
256. Cf. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Deregulation and Private Enforcement, 24 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 685, 695 (2020) (“Even when class actions do not do well at compensating, they can
still do well at deterring.”); see also Bartholomew, supra note 243, at 3261–62 (“Enhancing
fairness by guaranteeing judicial access is a gain separate from (and potentially more important
than) monetary compensation—particularly to class members.” (footnote omitted)).
257. 779 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2015).
258. Id.
259. See id. at 941.
260. See id.
261. See id.; Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Final Approval of
Settlement at 12, In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., No. 4:09-md-2029 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
28, 2012).
262. Roughly three months before the Walmart settlement, the district court granted
Netflix’s motion for summary judgment, finding plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing. See
Online DVD-Rental, 779 F.3d at 947.
263. See id.

367408-ILJ 97-4_Text.indd 280

6/15/22 1:00 PM

2022]

1363

ANTITRUST CLASS ACTIONS

class’s best interests.264 Luckily for class members, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.265
Had the objectors succeeded, they would have derailed the settlement, depriving
consumers of even an indirect benefit.
Professional objectors’ push to redefine a “reasonable” settlement threatens
already endangered indirect purchaser cases.266 Perseverating on monetary payouts
would hasten their demise. Limiting options for resolution diminishes incentives for
class counsel to pursue such claims. Indirect purchaser suits involve larger class
sizes, with small individual recovery for each class member.267 Cash disbursements
are impracticable, if not impossible in a given case. In addition, seeking final
approval of any settlement is riskier and potentially more costly than for direct
purchasers. Objections occurred in half of indirect purchaser cases, as opposed to
one-third of direct purchaser cases.

I

I
I

Table 7: Final Approvals by Objections and Purchaser Type
Objections
Direct/Indirect
Direct

75.0%
33.8%

Indirect

50.0%

Grand Total

38.4%

I

I

I

No Objections

Grand Total

25.0%
66.2%

12
299

50.0%

82

61.6%

393

I

I
I

Congress expressly enacted Rule 23 to ensure recourse for small-sum harms
suffered by a large number of individuals.268 In pushing for cash only, professional
objectors undermine that goal, making it less likely class counsel will pursue this
critical means of enforcement.269

264. See id. at 949–50 (discussing settlement objectors).
265. See id. at 955.
266. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing reforms’ chilling effect).
267. See William H. Page, The Limits of State Indirect Purchaser Suits: Class Certification
in the Shadow of Illinois Brick, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 3 (1999) (“[I]ndirect purchasers
(especially consumers) tend to be numerous and their individual harms small . . . .”); see, e.g.,
In re Flash Memory Antitrust Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (asserting
indirect purchaser claims on behalf of consumers in “repealer” states); In re Graphics
Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1096–97 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (same).
268. See STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 7 (1965);
see also Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“[T]he Advisory
Committee had dominantly in mind vindication of ‘the rights of groups of people who
individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all.’”
(citation omitted)).
269. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 17, at 677 (explaining how private enforcement “supplies
a set of ‘on the street’ enforcers closer to the relevant problems, along with enhanced
enforcement resources and continued enforcement during downturns in public enforcement”).
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B. The Push to Reduce Attorney Fee Awards
Objectors also push a second reform effort, targeting attorney fee awards for large
antitrust settlements.270 They urge courts to apply a “megafund rule.”271 The proposal
effectively replaces Rule 23(h)’s multifactor standard with a bright line mandate: the
higher the settlement amount, the lower the percentage awarded in fees.272 In doing
so, the eight factors courts usually consider when evaluating a fee award drop away;
the settlement amount alone dictates. In circuits that have embraced this reform,
courts slash fee percentages to as low as 4%.273 This section uses antitrust settlement
data to show that a megafund rule is the product of faux casuistry; its specious
foundation precludes any reasoned application. More troubling, this reform would
intensify the chilling effects detailed in Part II.B.274
1. The Megafund Rule Fallacy
Megafund challenges typically start when settlements exceed $50 million. By
$100 million, objections are 86.34% more likely.275 Seventy-four percent of these
objections were to fee awards. Once again, the objections are not the true danger.
Megafund objections rarely succeed: courts overruled 98% of the fee award
challenges. Rather, the true risk is objectors’ use of the settlement approvals to push

270. See supra Part II (detailing types of objections); see also, e.g., Order on Duke
Construction’s Objection to Class Counsel’s Request for Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursed
Expenses at 1, In re Ready Mixed Concrete Antitrust Litig., 1:05-cv-00979 (S.D. Ind. Mar 30,
2010) (same); Order Granting: (1) Final Approval of Settlement, (2) Award of Attorneys’ Fees
and (3) Application for Incentive Awards; and Entry of Final Judgment Dismissing Action
with Prejudice at 2, White v. NCAA, 2:06-cv-00999 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2008) (referencing fee
objection); Memorandum Op. & Ord. at 5, Spartanburg Reg’l Health Servs. Dist., Inc. v.
Hillenbrand Ind., 7:03-cv-02141 (D.S.C. Aug. 15, 2006) (same).
271. See, e.g., In re Optical Disk Drive Prod. Antitrust Litig., 959 F.3d 922, 932 (9th Cir.
2020); Objection to Request for Attorney’s Fees and Notice of Intention to Appear, In re
Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates, 1:13-cv-07789 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2018).
272. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litig., 768 F. App’x 651, 654 (9th Cir. 2019) (challenging a 20% fee award as “because this
is a ‘mega-fund’ case with a settlement of more than $200 million”); In re Cathode Ray Tube
(CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. 1917, 2016 WL 4126533, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2016), dismissed
sub nom. In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. 16-16368, 2017 WL 3468376
(9th Cir. Mar. 2, 2017); In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig., No. C 064333, 2014 WL 12879521, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2014) (objecting that “this is a ‘megafund’ case where, as a matter of law, the fee award should be less than the Ninth Circuit
benchmark fee of 25%”).
273. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. Sales Pracs. Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 458 (D.N.J. 1997)
(noting that percentage awards in megafund cases range from 4.1% to 17.92% of fund); see
also Order at 1, In re Comcast Corp. Set-Top Cable Television Box Antitrust Litig., 2:09-md02034 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 24, 2019) (6.6% fee award after deducting costs); Final Judgment
Awarding Attorneys’ Fees at 2, In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust
Litig., 1:05-md-1720 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2014) (9% fee award after deducting costs).
274. See supra Part II.B.
275. Settlements of $50M and above are 46.15% more likely to receive an objection.
Settlements valued at $100M and above are 59.76% more likely to receive an objection.
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procedural reform. Even an unsuccessful megafund challenge impacts fees. In
settlements over $100 million, courts notably deviate 30% from the median for
antitrust class actions once an objection is filed—regardless of the objection’s
success.
Table 8: Relation of Fee Award Mean, Median
for Final Approvals to Objections

I
I Final Approval Size I
IAll Final Approvals I

Objections

Less than $100M
No Objections
Objections
Over $100M
No Objections
Objections

I

Average

I

Median

I

27.6%

I

30.0%

28.4%
28.9%
27.3%
23.7%
25.9%
22.3%

I
I
I

30.0%
30.0%
25.0%
25.0%
30.0%
23.5%

A megafund rule is a sorites paradox with too many unknowns.276 Is a $50 million
settlement actually “mega” for antitrust class actions? Does the cause of action
matter? Should it? If fee percentages should decrease, by what amount and why?
Given these unknowns, antitrust fee awards are erratic. Some courts start scaling at
$50 million; others, at $1 billion.277 The rate of discounting is similarly arbitrary, as
evidenced by fee awards for settlements over $100 million.

35%
30%
25%
20%
15%

Figure M: Fee Award Percentages in Settlements
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276. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 97, § 15:81 (detailing the problems with a megafund
approach and how it is but “a crude proxy for windfall as it may prove both under- and overinclusive”).
277. Compare, e.g., In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1775,
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The fallacy with the megafund rule lies in its precept: an economies of scale
rationale.278 Private antitrust enforcement is intended to benefit from economies of
scale.279 As the District Court of Alabama explains, “the normal 20% to 30% range
of fee percentages awarded” already reflects such economies.280 Class actions afford
plaintiffs “a position of parity with the defendant, who will exploit scale economies
whether or not the case is brought as a class action.”281
Advocates for a megafund rule flip the argument. Economies of scale are no
longer a benefit to the class but a weapon to cut fees. A megafund rule presumes that
at some point, classes become too efficient. At that critical point, class counsel
unfairly profit from economies of scale, thus justifying a lower fee award to obviate
a windfall.282 If a class settled for $100 million, class counsel might earn $25 million,

2009 WL 3077396, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2009) (awarding 15% of $85 million fund
under sliding scale approach), with In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. 3:07CV-5944, 2016 WL 721680, at *42 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (defining a megafund as “a
recovery of $100 million to over $1 billion”).
278. Judge Easterbrook elaborates on this reasoning by providing a clear example
explaining why fee awards in large sum cases should not deviate from the median award:
Under the court’s ruling, a $40 million settlement would have led to the same
aggregate fees as the actual $132 million settlement. Private parties would never
contract for such an arrangement, because it would eliminate counsel’s incentive
to press for more than $74 million from the defendants. Under the district court’s
approach, no sane lawyer would negotiate a settlement of more than $74 million
and less than $225 million; even the higher figure would make sense only if it
were no more costly to obtain $225 million for the class than to garner $74
million.
In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2001).
279. See The Paths of Civil Litigation: Class Actions: Market Models for Attorneys’ Fees
in Class Action Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1827, 1831–32 (2000) (“[T]he aggregation of
individual claims creates substantial economies of scale.”); William H.J. Hubbard, Optimal
Class Size, Dukes, and the Funny Thing About Shady Grove, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 693, 700
(2013) (“A fundamental rationale for class actions is that they take advantage of economies of
scale in the litigation of related claims.”).
280. Cf. Mashburn v. Nat’l Healthcare, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 679, 695 (M.D. Ala. 1988)
(rejecting argument to reduce fees because of alleged economies of scale).
281. Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 1381.
282. See, e.g., In re NASDAQ Mkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 465, 486
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[W]here a class recovers more than $75–$200 million . . . fees in the range
of 6–10 percent and even lower are common . . . .”); In re Platinum & Palladium Commodities
Litig., No. 10-CV-3617, 2015 WL 4560206, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2015) (“To avoid a
windfall where the recovered funds run into the tens of millions, courts typically decrease the
percentage of the fee as the size of the fund increases.” (citation omitted)); Carlson v. Xerox
Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 400, 404 (D. Conn. 2009) (“[L]ower percentages of the fund” should
be awarded “as the size of the fund increase[s] . . . .”). Objectors frequently cite two class
action studies to support a mandatory megafund. See, e.g., In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT)
Antitrust Litig., No. 3:07-cv-5944, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24951 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016).
One study focused on published and unpublished settlements from 2006–2007. Fitzpatrick,
supra note 7, at 814. The other focused on only published opinions but covered a significantly
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or 25% in fees. If a case settled for $1 billion, class counsel could earn $250 million,
even though the case was not necessarily 100 times harder to litigate.283 Objectors
use this logic to argue for reducing fees proportionately as settlement amounts
increase.284
Despite the facial appeal of objectors’ argument, fee awards in antitrust class
actions are not reflecting any principled application of economies of scale. A
standard representation of economies of scale is “U.” Unit costs gradually fall as
output increases. Then, at some point, when output increases enough, costs begin to
climb. Fee awards in antitrust class actions, where many courts already embrace
objectors’ push for a megafund rule, look nothing like a theoretical economies of
scale model. Fees do not gradually diminish to reflect scaling—they simply plummet
once a settlement crosses the $100 million threshold without fully rebounding.285
Figure N: Average & Median Fee Award
by Settlement Amount
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longer time frame (1993–2018). Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 249. Both studies identify
an inverse relationship between the size of the recovery and the fee award percentages. These
findings are primarily descriptive; the authors of these studies do not urge a megafund rule. In
fact, Professor Fitzpatrick has affirmatively pushed against scaling fees. See, e.g., Declaration
of Brian T. Fitzpatrick, In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig. (Direct Purchaser Actions), No.
1:13-md-02472 (D.R.I. Apr. 20, 2020).
283. See, e.g., Court Awarded Att’y Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 256 (1986) (“[A]bsent unusual
circumstances, the percentage will decrease as the size of the fund increases.”); In re Copley
Pharm., Inc., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1407, 1413 (D. Wyo. 1998).
284. See, e.g., Objections to Co-Lead Counsel for Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs’ Notice of
Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses & Service Awards and
Notice of Intent to Appear at the May 8, 2018 Fairness Hearing, In re Lithium Ion Batteries,
Antitrust Litig., 4:13-md-02420 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2018); Objection to Request for Attorney’s
Fees and Notice of Intention to Appear, In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig.,
1:13-cv-07789 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2018); Objection to Proposed Class Action Settlement and
Award of Attorneys’ Fees, In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., 3:07-cv-05944
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2015).
285. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 97, § 15:81 (“[T]he mega-fund approach is an odd idea
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Critics may say this disparity between a theoretical economies of scale
representation and the actual distribution of fee awards is because not all courts apply
a megafund rule. This would be incorrect. The disconnect is because a megafund rule
improperly presumes the size of the settlement correlates with economies of scale.
Essentially, objectors are urging courts to use ungrounded abstract legal
reduction. The settlement amount says little about the “results obtained” in the
case.286 The key inquiry in deciding a fee award is the results achieved for the class.287
A $15 million settlement may be a tremendous victory or deeply unimpressive.
Inversely correlating settlement amount and fee rates does not clarify when
economies of scale are desirable from when they are a windfall. Economies of scale
could increase alongside class size288 or the number of defendants, yet a megafund
rule does not reflect these variables.289 For a given settlement range, even litigation
costs alone greatly vary.

Cost to Settlement Ratio

Figure O: Ratio of Costs to Settlement Size for
Settlements $100M to $600M
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in that it implies that everything is rational until $100 million, but irrational thereafter, creating
a cliff-like effect rather than a gradually-reducing percentage along the lines of a hill.”).
286. See Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1204–05 (S.D. Fla.
2006).
287. See Hensely v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983) (“[T]he most critical factor is the
degree of success obtained.”); Behrens v. Wometco Enters., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 534, 547–48
(S.D. Fla. 1988) (“The quality of work performed in a case that settles before trial is best
measured by the benefit obtained.” (citation omitted)).
288. See, e.g., David Betson & Jay Tidmarsh, Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and
“Indivisible” Remedies, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 542, 552–53 (2011) (discussing relationship
between economies of scale and class size).
289. The dataset review shows no noticeable relationship between class size and fee
awards. Cases with less than ten defendants averaged a fee award of 28%, whereas cases with
more than ten defendants averaged a fee award of 25%.
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Settlement amounts also do not reflect how additional factors—such as case theory,
purchaser type, or defendants’ resources—could impact economies of scale. Even if
economies scale up as settlements increase, how much scaling is unknowable.290
Thus, fee scaling is not addressing economies of scales. Instead, as the next Section
explains, its purpose lies elsewhere.
2. The Danger of a Megafund Rule
An arbitrary megafund rule risks undermining regulatory oversight at a time when
that oversight is already threatened.291 Once untethered from its faulty premise, a
megafund rule’s real purpose becomes clear: regulatory reform. Drastically reducing
fee awards removes a core incentive to undertake private antitrust enforcement.
Fewer skilled attorneys means fewer successful class actions—and an overall
reduction of competition oversight.292 Congress intended antitrust treble damages
and fee awards to “encourage private enforcement of the antitrust laws.”293 Such
cases “call for the very best the federal courts can provide”294—even more so now
given the gauntlet of increased procedural gatekeeping set out in Part I.
Even a reform that reduces fees starting at a modest $100 million amount would
significantly reduce the primary incentive for pursuing private enforcement. Sixtynine percent of the fee awards during the studied period ($4.65 billion) came from
antitrust settlements exceeding $100 million. The current median award was 25%,

290. To avoid undefined parameters, some objectors urge courts to rely heavily on class
counsel’s lodestar in megafund cases. See, e.g., Notice of Intention to Appear and Objection
to Proposed Settlement and Request for Attorney’s Fees at 9, In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs.
Antitrust Litig., 1:06-md-01775 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2008) (advancing megafund challenge
then urging court to use class counsel’s lodestar as “a decisive factor”). Such a result would
resurrect the very randomness that courts sought to cure by using Rule 23(h)’s multifactor
approach. See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prod. Bus. Sec. Litig., 724 F. Supp.
160, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (explaining how lodestar “computations, no matter how
conscientious, often seem to take on the character of so much Mumbo Jumbo”); Reagan W.
Silber & Frank E. Goodrich, Common Funds and Common Problems: Fee Objections and
Class Counsel’s Response, 17 REV. LITIG. 525, 529 (1998) (“[C]ourts and commentators found
that the lodestar formula caused more problems than it solved.”).
291. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing how existing reforms chill private enforcement).
292. Megafund challenges are not the only strategy objectors adopt to reduce fees. Courts
generally award costs in addition to fees. Rather than take aim at the percent, some objectors
urge courts to award a gross fee and cost award. See, e.g., Objection of Melissa Holyoak &
John Tabin at 11–12, In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 1:10-md-02196 (N.D. Ohio
Nov. 12, 2015); Objection to Proposed Class Action Settlement & Award of Attorneys’ Fees,
supra note 284 (challenging fee request, raising megafund and net vs. gross objections). But a
gross award of 30% is not the same as a 30% fee award. See, e.g., In re Pool Prod. Distrib.
Mkt. Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 2328, 2015 WL 4528880, at *23 (E.D. La. July 27, 2015)
(awarding gross award of 33.33% that drops to 17.3% when computed net costs). Using gross
amounts will only mean even lower fee awards, as the cost of antitrust class actions continues
to rise. See supra Part II.B.
293. Image Tech. Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 136 F.3d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1998);
Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy Inc., 776 F.2d 646, 661 (7th Cir. 1985); Perkins v.
Standard Oil Co., 474 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1973).
294. Mullinax v. Willett Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 422, 423 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
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with an average rate of 23.87%. A modest mandatory fee cap of 15% would reduce
fee awards by 19%, a loss of just under $1 billion for the coffers of antitrust class
action attorneys. If the more radical 4% cap were applied, attorney fees would shrink
78.6%, or $3.65 billion.
In pushing a megafund rule, objectors overlook how a trans-substantive change
to calculating fees would disproportionately impact antitrust class actions. Objectors
frequently cite fee awards in securities or consumer class action cases to challenge
antitrust requests,295 ignoring that antitrust settlements trend higher. Compare
antitrust to securities class actions, for example. Only roughly the top 10% of
securities class action settlements exceeded $50 million, in contrast to 27.2% of
antitrust settlements.296 This disparity is likely to increase given the growth rate of
antitrust settlement amounts.297
Not only would a one-size-fits-all megafund rule impact antitrust more than other
types of class actions, the percent reduction at stake is also greater. Antitrust cases
“are notoriously complex, protracted, and bitterly fought.”298 The “wisdom and
deliberation”299 needed to litigate such cases exceed other areas of private
enforcement. But as it stands, fee awards for the top decile of antitrust cases are
roughly 2% lower than the average across all class actions.300

295. See, e.g., Objection to Request for Attorney’s Fees and Notice of Intention to Appear
at 9–10, In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., No. 1:13-cv-07789 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 6, 2018); Christopher Andrews, Pro Se Objector, Non Attorney Supplement to Objection
Received by the Court on September 14, 2016, In re Optical Disk Drive Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
3:10-md-2143 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2016).
296. CORNERSTONE RSCH., SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2020 REVIEW AND
ANALYSIS,
19
app.3
(2020),
https://www.cornerstone.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/12/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2020-Review-andAnalysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4WA-2EFU].
297. See supra Part II.A.
298. Weseley v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 711 F. Supp. 713, 719 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (citations
omitted); In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., No. 04-1616, 2016 WL 4060156, at *5 (D. Kan. July
29, 2016) (rejecting megafund objection after noting “a one-third fee is customary in
contingent-fee cases, and indeed that figure is often higher for complex cases”); see also In re
Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1775, 2015 WL 5918273, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2015) (“[T]he complexity of federal antitrust cases is well known.” (citation
omitted)); Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n., 460 F.2d 932, 945–46 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
299. See, e.g., Mullinax, 381 F. Supp. at 423 (comparing the “wisdom and deliberation”
necessary for the complexity of an antitrust class action with the “basically simple” truth in
lending cases); Kimberly L. King, An Antitrust Primer for Trade Association Counsel, 75 FLA.
BAR J. 26, 29 (2001) (“No litigation is more complex, drawn out, or expensive than antitrust
litigation.”).
300. The mean fee award for the largest class recoveries (those in the 10% decline) was
21.5%. In contrast, the median fee award for all class action settlements was 22.3%. See
Eisenberg et al., supra note 7, at 948.
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Table 9: Fee Award Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation
by Settlement Size

I

Settlement Size (in Millions)
[$0 to $2.75]
(n=35)
[$2.75 to $5]
(n=34)
[$5 to $10]
(n=35)
[$10 to $16.9]
(n = 34)
[$16.9 to $24.5]
(n = 34)
[$24.5 to $32.5]
(n = 34)
[$32.5 to $49.9]
(n = 35)
[$49.9 to $78]
(n = 34)
[$78 to $175]
(n = 35)
[$175 to $5,620]
(n = 35)
Total (n = 345)

II

Mean

I

Median

I

SD

29.0%

30.0%

6.4%

27.3%

30.0%

6.8%

28.5%

30.0%

6.6%

27.3%

30.0%

7.4%

30.7%

33.3%

3.5%

28.7%

30.0%

5.3%

28.7%

30.0%

6.2%

28.0%

30.0%

5.8%

26.2%

25.0%

7.2%

21.8%

22.0%

6.8%

27.60%

30.0%

6.7%

I
I

Such a marked impact on private antitrust enforcement weakens the incentives
for counsel to pursue such claims.301 Class action counsel are risk adverse.302 Even
before 2005 and the slew of procedural reforms that followed CAFA, class counsel
bemoaned the pro-defendant shift in the field.303 As noted in Part II, as settlement

301. See id. at 937–38 (“If fees are set too low, counsel will not receive fair compensation
for their services to the class. Worse yet, if fees are too low, then qualified counsel will not
bring these cases in the first place. Injured parties will receive no redress, and potential
wrongdoers will no longer be deterred out of fear of potential class action liability.”).
302. Critics use class counsels’ risk-averse nature as ammunition. See, e.g., John C. Coffee,
Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter
Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 230 (1983) (“Because the lawyer as bounty hunter has
reason to be more risk averse than the clients he represents, his relative independence from his
client implies also a greater danger of inadequate settlements, which in turn undercuts the
deterrent threat of the law.”).
303. See Stephen D. Susman & John B. McArthur, If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It!, 55
ANTITRUST L.J. 59, 60 (1986) (“The antitrust laws have never restrained business as little as
they do today. In the twenty years that I have practiced antitrust law, this is the worst time, the
hardest time, the least likely time, for a plaintiff to bring or win an antitrust case. Things have
never been worse. In my twenty years of practice, there has never been a time when antitrust
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sizes increase, so do expenses.304 Such costs are only recoverable if the case is
successful; otherwise, counsel must absorb them.305 The existing procedural reforms
already reduce the likelihood of that recovery.306
Rather than roll the dice, pursuing other types of class litigation—while foregoing
antitrust—is a smarter gamble.307 Decisions regarding which cases to pursue must be
made.308 Firms employing private antitrust attorneys tend to specialize in class
actions generally309—not just antitrust. This reduces switching costs for diversifying
firm case portfolios. With a megafund rule, a class action firm might strategically
invest in the occasional high-stake, high-potential-return antitrust case. If the result
is large enough, even a deeply reduced fee percentage could be worthwhile. But the
largest ration of their war chests would be preserved for litigation that provides a
more consistent return on counsel’s time and cost investments. For example,
securities class actions provide quicker resolution, and only high-volume courts scale
securities fee awards.310
While other, less risk adverse counsel may still proceed with a large antitrust case
in hopes of a big pay day, a megafund rule chances a smaller pool of skilled, willing
attorneys. Reducing oversight risks the stability of competitive markets at a time
when prior reforms have already left antitrust class actions facing higher gatekeeping
and expenses.

law was more favorable to defendants, or when defendants engaged in so many activities,
including mergers and vertical restraints, without liability and without much fear of liability.”).
304. See supra Part II.
305. See Silverman v. Motorola Solutions, Inc., 739 F.3d 956, 958 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“Contingent fees compensate lawyers for the risk of nonpayment. The greater the risk of
walking away empty-handed, the higher the award must be to attract competent and energetic
counsel.” (citation omitted)); Morris Ratner, A New Model of Plaintiffs’ Class Action
Attorneys, 31 REV. LITIG. 757, 767 (2012) (defining the relationship between class action
settlement amount and costs noting a “point . . . where further efforts produce little or no
return” (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform,
62 IND. L.J. 625, 688 (1987))).
306. See, e.g., Kesey, LLC v. Francis, No. 06-CV-540, 2010 WL 4235857, at *5 (D. Or.
July 27, 2010) (“[A]n award of attorneys’ fees would ‘compensate them for serving as a private
attorney general [and] encourage future private enforcement . . . .’” (citation omitted)). These
awards also fund continued litigation against non-settling defendants. In re Asbestos Sch.
Litig., No. 83–0268, 1988 WL 82853, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 1988) (authorizing $1 million
litigation escrow fund from class settlements for use in action against non-settling defendants).
307. See Charles Silver, Due Process and the Lodestar Method: You Can’t Get There from
Here, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1809, 1839 (2000) (“The risk of a below-average fee will . . . do more
to dampen a lawyer’s enthusiasm in a large case than a small one.”).
308. See supra Part II.B.1.
309. Three of the firms that most frequently represented settled antitrust class actions
during the studied period all have a range of practice areas. See, e.g., Practice Areas, COHEN
MILSTEIN, https://www.cohenmilstein.com/practice-areas [https://perma.cc/3BB3-5XQA];
Class Action Litigation Practice, HAGENS BERMAN, https://www.hbsslaw.com/practices/classaction [https://perma.cc/3BB3-5XQA]; What We Do, SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.,
https://www.susmangodfrey.com/practicess-industries/ [https://perma.cc/W492-B6M9].
310. See Lynn A. Baker, Michael A. Perino & Charles Silver, Is the Price Right? An
Empirical Study of Fee-Setting in Securities Class Actions, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1371, 1398
(2015) (“[I]n high-volume districts, the downward slope of the fitted values line is steeper.”).
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CONCLUSION
It would be naïve to say all is well with antitrust class actions. Over fifteen years
of reforms have flooded this primary form of regulatory oversight. More proposals
await just on the horizon, bolstered by unsubstantiated claims that class actions need
curtailing. Rather than continuing to trade on supposition, the original dataset
underlying this Article allows scholars, courts, and attorneys to assess the vitality of
private antitrust enforcement in the wake of the procedural reforms to date.
The overwhelming conclusion from this empirical analysis warrants alarm.
Waves of procedural changes have reduced judicial access, compensation, and
deterrence. Class actions continue to regulate the American economy. But the rise of
arbitration and class action waivers, coupled with harsher dismissal and certification
standards, have weakened private enforcement. The modern antitrust class action can
right fewer wrongs than a decade ago. The number of antitrust class actions is on the
decline. Expenses are on the rise. Cases are taking longer. The number of procedural
hurdles is growing. All of this imposes a considerable cost to private antitrust
enforcement efforts.
Procedural changes rarely trigger the excitement or media attention that changes
to substantive law do. However, class action reformists, cloaked as objectors, have
already shown their ability to manipulate procedure to their will. For those pinning
their hopes on private antitrust suits, future work must incorporate a clear focus on
anticipating and responding to objectors’ procedural attacks. Otherwise, the modest
resurgence of antitrust enthusiasm will be short lived.
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